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Zero-knowledge protocols allow one party to prove the validity of a mathemat-
ical statement to another party, without revealing any additional information. The
use of zero-knowledge in internet applications has boomed recently; this is no
surprise considering that internet privacy has become such an important issue
in the last few years.
The original zero-knowledge definition considers the setting where an ad-
versarial verifier interacts only with one honest prover. In the age of the internet,
however, a great number of sessions of the same protocol are executed concur-
rently. This led to the definition of concurrent zero-knowledge (cZK) by Dwork,
Naor and Sahai (Journal of ACM, 2004). Concurrent zero-knowledge protocols
are secure against adversarial verifiers who may launch a coordinated attack
against multiple independent honest provers, concurrently.
Much study has already been done on the subject of cZK, resulting in a wide
range of constructions under different hardness assumptions, and in different
models (e.g., the plain model or with setup assumptions). Moving beyond the
original focus on constructions, this thesis works on improving our understand-
ing of cZK in three areas: security, efficiency, and simplicity. In part 1 we simplify
and extend the current techniques to construct cZK protocols with additional
security properties such as “knowledge precision”. In part 2 we present a very
practical cZK protocol in the timing model. In part 3 we investigate the curious
phenomenon that no known cZK protocol is public-coin.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Zero-knowledge (ZK) interactive protocols, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali
and Rackoff [31], are paradoxical constructs that allow one party, called the
prover, to convince another party, called the verifier, of the validity of a math-
ematical statement x ∈ L, while providing zero additional knowledge to the
Verifier. Beyond being fascinating in their own right, ZK protocols are funda-
mental building blocks in cryptography and have numerous applications (e.g.,
see [24, 68]). Formally, the zero-knowledge property requires that the view of
any adversarial verifier, V , during an interaction with the prover P, can be ef-
ficiently reconstructed by some efficient simulator, S . A very common way of
constructing zero-knowledge protocols is to construct a universal simulator S
that can reconstruct the view of any adversary V∗, when only given black-box
access to V∗. This type of black-box simulators achieves the stronger notion of
black-box zero-knowledge.
The original ZK definition considers the scenario where an adversarial ver-
ifier interacts only with one honest prover. In the age of the internet, however,
a great number of sessions of the same protocol are executed concurrently, ren-
dering the definition of ZK inadequate. This led to the definition of concurrent
zero-knowledge (cZK), first formalized by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [20]. Consider
a concurrent adversarial verifier who may initiate multiple sessions of the same
protocol with independent honest provers; the adversary has the power to ar-
bitrarily interleave the order in which messages are exchanged among the dif-
ferent sessions, and can generate messages in one session based on prover re-
sponses received in others. Concurrent zero-knowledge requires that the view
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of any concurrent adversarial verifier (which is considerably more complex than
the view of a single interaction) can still be reconstructed by some efficient sim-
ulator.
Previous Work
When restricted to black-box simulation, Canetti, Kilian, Petrank and Rosen
[14], building upon previous results [43, 65], show that cZK protocols must have
(essentially) logarithmic round complexity. This lower bound is matched by
the work of Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai [61], building upon previous results
[64, 42]; they construct black-box cZK proofs for all of NP, based on claw-free
family of permutation, with (essentially) logarithmic rounds. Outside of the
“plain model”, many black-box cZK protocols have been constructed relying on
setup assumptions (e.g., [21, 18, 13, 20]); the setup assumptions (e.g., the com-
mon reference string model, the timing model, the bare public-key model, etc.)
enables these works to bypass the aforementioned lower bound and construct
sub-logarithmic, even constant round, black-box concurrent zero-knowledge
protocols.
Outside of black-box simulation, no cZK protocol is known. However, using
a novel technique, Barak [3] is able to construct a constant-round non-black-box
ZK protocol that is secure under bounded composition. That is, given an a priori
bound on the number of concurrent sessions, there exists a ZK protocol that re-
mains secure against concurrent adversarial verifiers that initiates less sessions
than the given bound (in this case, the message length of Barak’s protocol de-
pends on this bound).
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Despite having many positive constructions, there are many aspects of con-
current zero-knowledge still under investigation. For example, why are all
known concurrent zero-knowledge protocols private-coin, whereas the origi-
nal ZK protocols [31, 28, 10] are public-coin?1 Other questions are more open
ended, such as the search for a truly practical cZK protocol; current protocols are
often inefficient (e.g., protocols in the plain model requires logarithmic rounds
[14]), or require costly setup assumptions (e.g., public-key registry). Addition-
ally, there are many desirable properties of zero-knowledge protocols, such as
non-malleability [19] and precision [49], that we do not fully understand in the
context of cZK (Barak, Prabhakaran and Sahai [7] are able to construct concur-
rent non-malleable zero-knowledge arguments2, but not proofs).
Overview
In this thesis we present a collection of works regarding concurrent zero-knowledge
that answers some of the questions raise above. The results are grouped into
three chapters, each with its own theme. Below we give an overview of each
chapter; a more detailed exposition of relevant past works and techniques can
be found in each chapter.
The main result of Chapter 2 is a revamped analysis of the best known black-
box cZK protocol in the plain model. Based largely on the work of Prabhakaran,
Rosen and Sahai [61], our analysis contains several novel technical simplifi-
cations and extensions. As a direct consequence, we are able to construct a
1An interactive protocol is public-coin [2] if the verifier messages are simply segments of its
random tape.
2An interactive protocol is an argument instead of a proof if the soundness condition only
holds with respect to polynomial-time bounded provers (as opposed to all possible interactive
Turing machines).
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broader class of cZK protocols, and have more flexibility when designing the
zero-knowledge simulator. Although the new analysis by itself does not es-
tablish new theorems (the new cZK protocols do not improve upon existing
protocols constructed by [61] in terms of round complexity or assumptions), it
proves to be useful in applications. For example, we show at the end of Chapter
1 how to construct precise cZK protocols [49] easily using the new analysis. The
new analysis is also used in a joint work with Lin, Pass and Venkitasubrama-
niam [44] to construct the first concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge proof
[19] (the first concurrent non-malleable argument is constructed in [7]), as well
as the first cZK protocol that is simultaneously precise and concurrently non-
malleable. Chapter 2 is based on the following works: [55].
Chapter 3 focuses on developing a practical cZK protocol. As mentioned
before, in the plain model, black-box cZK protocols suffers from a logarithmic
round-complexity lower bound (and known non-black-box techniques are in-
herently impractical due to the use of Karp reductions). Therefore we propose
a solution in the timing model [20]. The timing model only assumes that ev-
ery party has access to a stopwatch; it is one of the cheapest setup assumptions
(compared to, say, the cost of maintaining a public-key registry). Previous cZK
protocols in the timing model [20, 25] suffer from a one and only drawback
that every execution of the protocols must be delayed by the maximum round
trip latency of the network. (Imagine the internet, and someone with a hor-
rid dial-up connection!) In this chapter, we show that by increasing the round
complexity modestly (though still keeping the round complexity constant), the
“imposed delay” on every protocol execution can be decreased “exponentially”;
our cZK simulator and analysis in the timing model is inspired by the work of
Richardson and Kilian [64] (who construct the first cZK protocol in the plain
4
model), and the work of Pass and Venkitasubramaniam [59]. Additionally, we
introduce a novel technique in the timing model called eye-for-an-eye penalties:
for example, if a (possibly adversarial) verifier took one second to respond to
the last prover message, then the prover would delay its next message also by
one second. With eye-for-an-eye penalties, we can reduce the “imposed delay”
even further, therefore eliminating the only obstacle of having a truly practical
cZK protocol in the timing model. Chapter 3 is based on the following work:
[56].
In Chapter 4, we investigate why all known cZK protocols are private-coin.
This is so even if we consider ZK protocols that remain secure only under paral-
lel repetition. We show that this is no accident: only trivial languages (languages
in BPP) have black-box ZK protocols secure under parallel repetition. On the
other hand, Barak [3] shows that if we use non-black-box simulation techniques
and settle for bounded concurrency3, then there exists public-coin ZK protocols for
all of NP. We further show that only one such “relaxation” is necessary; that is,
we construct public-coin black-box ZK protocols secure under bounded concur-
rent repetition for all of NP, as well as public-coin non-black-box ZK protocols
secure under full parallel repetition for all of NP (building upon Barak’s tech-
niques). Together, these works complete the picture on the existence of public-
coin ZK protocols secure against parallel repetitions, given the choice of black-
box simulation vs. non-black-box simulation, and full concurrency vs. bounded
concurrency. Chapter 4 is based on the following works: [57, 54].
3In bounded concurrency, a protocol is secure only if the number of sessions is less than an a
priori bound.
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1.1 Preliminaries
Given (bit) strings x and y, let |x| denotes the length of string x, and x‖y or more
simply xy denote the concatenation of x and y.
Let N to denote the set of non-negative integers, R to denote the set of real
numbers, and [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n} of n ∈ N.
A function ν : N → R is negligible if for all c > 0, ν(n) < n−c for sufficiently
large n (i.e., ν ∈ n−ω(1)). Given a function g, let gk be the function computed by
composing g together k times, i.e., gk(x) = g(gk−1(x)) and g0(x) = x.
A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) machine is a machine whose run-
ning time is polynomially bounded in the length of its first input. An expected
PPT machine is a machine whose expected running time is polynomially bounded
in the length of its first input. A non-uniform (expected or not) PPT machine ad-
ditionally receives an advice string; the advice string is a function of the length
of the machine’s first input.
1.1.1 Interactive Protocols
An interactive protocol (first introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff
[31], and Babai and Moran [2]) is a pair of interactive Turing machines, Π =
(P,V), where V runs in probabilistic polynomial time (PPT). P is called the prover,
while V is called the verifier. Let 〈P,V〉 (x) denote the random variable (over the
randomness of P and V) representing the output of V at the end of the interac-
tion on common input x. If additionally V receives auxiliary input z, we write
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〈P(x),V(x, z)〉 to denote the output of V . If 〈P,V〉 (x) = 1, we say the verifier
accepts the input x; if 〈P,V〉 (x) = 0, we say the verifier rejects the input x. Sim-
ilarly, we let ViewV(P,V)(x) or ViewV(P(x),V(x, z)) denote the random variable
representing the view of V in these interactions, where thew view of V includes
the random tape it used and the messages it received.
We assume without loss of generality that all protocols start with a verifier
message and end with a prover message. We say Π has k rounds if the prover
and verifier each sends k messages alternately. The notation 〈v1, p1, . . .〉 spec-
ifies a full or partial transcript of Π where v denotes verifier messages and p
denotes prover messages. Π is public-coin if the verifier messages are just dis-
joint segments of V’s random tape; Π is private-coin otherwise. In general, both
the prover and verifier may abort midway in the protocol (either maliciously,
or in response to invalid messages). If Π is public-coin, however, we may with-
out loss of generality consider non-aborting verifiers (aborting verifiers may be
considered to be sending the all 0’s message, which is always valid).
In Chapter 4 we discuss repeating an interactive protocol in parallel. Let
Πm = (Pm,Vm) be Π repeated in m parallel sessions; that is, each prover and
verifier message in Πm is just concatenation of m copies of the corresponding
message in Π. We allow m to be a polynomial, which means the protocol Πm, on
input x, contains m(|x|) parallel sessions. Pm and Vm follow the strategy of P and
V in each session with independent randomness; in the end, Vm accepts if and
only if all m sessions are accepted by V .
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1.1.2 Interactive Proofs and Arguments
We state the definition of interactive proofs (introduced by Goldwasser, Micali
and Rackoff [31]) and arguments (introduced by Brassard, Chaum and Crepeau
[11]).
Definition 1 (Interactive Proofs and Arguments). An interactive protocol Π =
(P,V) is an interactive proof (resp., interactive argument) system for a language L
if there exists a negligible function ν(·) such that the following two conditions
hold:
Completeness: For every x ∈ L, Pr[〈P,V〉 (x) = 1] = 1.
Soundness: For every x < L and every interactive Turing machine (resp., every
probabilistic polynomial time) P∗, Pr[〈P∗,V〉 (x) = 1] ≤ ν(|x|).
1.1.3 Indistinguishability
The following definition of computational indistinguishability originates in the
seminal paper of Goldwasser and Micali [30]. Let X be a countable set of strings.
A probability ensemble indexed by X is a sequence of random variables in-
dexed by X. Namely, any element of A = {Ax}x∈X is a random variable indexed
by X.
Definition 2 (Indistinguishability). Let X and Y be countable sets. Two en-
sembles {Ax,y}x∈X,y∈Y and {Bx,y}x∈X,y∈Y are computationally indistinguishable over
x ∈ X, if for every non-uniform PPT machine D (the distinguisher) whose run-
ning time is polynomial in its first input, there exists a negligible function ν(·) so
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that for every x ∈ X, y ∈ Y :
∣∣∣∣Pr [D(x, y, Ax,y) = 1] − Pr [D(x, y, Bx,y) = 1]∣∣∣∣ < ν(|x|)
(In the above expression, D is simply given a sample from Ax,y and Bx,y, respec-
tively.) {Ax,y}x∈X,y∈Y and {Bx,y}x∈X,y∈Y are said to be statistically indistinguishable
over X if the above condition holds for all (possibly unbounded) machines D.
1.1.4 Commitments
Commitment schemes are crucial to the construction of zero-knowledge proto-
cols. A commitment scheme enables a party, called the sender, to commit itself
to a value to another party, the receiver. At first the value is hidden from the
receiver; this property is called hiding. At a later stage when the commitment is
opened, it can only reveal a single value as determined in the committing phase;
this property is called binding. It is enough to consider bit commitments; com-
mitment schemes that commits only to the value 0 or 1. First we define the
structure of a commitment scheme.
Definition 3 (Commitment Schemes). A commitment scheme is an interactive
protocol Com = (S ,R) with the following properties:
1. Both the sender S and the receiver R are PPT machines.
2. The commitment scheme has two stages: a commit stage and a reveal
stage. In both stages, S and R receive a security parameter 1n as com-
mon input. S additionally receives a private input b ∈ {0, 1} that is the bit
to be committed.
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3. The commit stage results in a joint output c, called the commitment, and
a private output for S , d, called the decommitment string. Without loss of
generality, c can be the full transcript of the interaction between S and R,
and d can be the private random tape of S .
4. In the reveal stage, sender S sends the pair (b, d) to the receiver R. The
receiver R accepts or rejects the decommitment (c, b, d).
If S and R do not deviate from the protocol, then R should accept (with prob-
ability 1) during the reveal stage. A commitment scheme is public-coin if all
messages sent by the receiver R are segments of its random tape.
Next we define the binding and hiding property of a commitment scheme.
Definition 4 (Binding). A commitment scheme Com = (S ,R) is statistically
(resp. computationally) binding if for every machine (resp. non-uniform PPT
machine) S ∗ (a malicious sender), there exists a negligible function ν such that
S ∗ succeeds in the following game with probability at most ν(n):
On security parameter 1n, S ∗ first interacts with R in the commit stage
to produce commitment c. Then S outputs two decommitments
(c, 0, d0) and (c, 1, d1), and succeeds if R accepts both decommitments.
The commitment scheme is perfectly binding if no machine S ∗ can ever succeed
at the above game.
Definition 5 (Hiding). A commitment scheme Com = (S ,R) is computationally
(resp. statistically or perfectly) hiding if for every non-uniform PPT machine
(resp. every machine) R∗ (a malicious receiver), the following ensembles are
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computationally indistinguishable over n ∈ N (resp. statistically indistinguish-
able over n ∈ N, or identical):
{ViewR∗(S (1n, 0),R∗(1n))}n∈N ≈ {ViewR∗(S (1n, 1),R∗(1n))}n∈N
Non-interactive statistically-binding commitment schemes can be constructed
using any one-to-one one-way function (see Section 4.4.1 of [24]). Allowing
some minimal interaction (in which the receiver first sends a single random ini-
tialization message), statistically-binding commitment schemes can be obtained
from any one-way function [50, 35]. Polynomial-round statistically-hiding com-
mitment schemes can be constructed from one-way functions [33] (constant-
round constructions exist under stronger assumptions).
1.2 Zero-Knowledge and Concurrency
An interactive proof is said to be zero-knowledge if it yields nothing beyond
the validity of the statement being proved. Formally, zero-knowledge requires
that the view of any adversarial verifier can be reconstructed by an efficient
simulator.
Definition 6 (Zero-Knowledge [31]). An interactive protocol (P,V) for language
L is zero-knowledge if for every PPT adversarial verifier V∗, there exists an ex-
pected PPT simulator S such that the following two ensembles are computa-
tionally indistinguishable over x ∈ L:
{ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈ {S (x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
A stronger definition is that of black-box zero-knowledge, in which there
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is one universal simulator S that must generate the view of any adversarial V∗,
given only black-box access to V∗.
Definition 7 (Black-Box Zero-Knowledge [29]). An interactive protocol (P,V) for
language L is black-box zero-knowledge if there exists an expected PPT simula-
tor S such that for every PPT adversarial verifier V∗, the following two ensem-
bles are computationally indistinguishable over x ∈ L:
{ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈
{
S V
∗(x,z)(x)
}
x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
Note that the simulator S does not have access to z, the auxiliary input of V∗.
As a result, we may assume that V∗ is deterministic, because V∗ can treat part of
z as its random tape.
1.2.1 Concurrent Zero-Knowledge
Given an interactive protocol (P,V) and a polynomial m, an m-session concur-
rent adversarial verifier V∗ is a PPT machine that, on common input x and aux-
iliary input z, interacts with up to m(|x|) independent copies of P concurrently.
The different interactions are called sessions. There are no restrictions on how
V∗ schedules the messages among the different sessions, and V∗ may choose to
abort some sessions but not others (unless if the protocol is public-coin).
Definition 8 (Concurrent Zero-Knowledge [20]). An interactive protocol (P,V)
for language L is is black-box concurrent zero-knowledge if for every concurrent
adversarial verifier V∗ (i.e., any m-session concurrent adversarial verifier for any
polynomial m), there exists an expected PPT black-box simulator S such that
for every common input x, auxiliary input z, the following two ensembles are
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computationally indistinguishable over x ∈ L
{ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈ {S (x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
We may also extend the definition of black-box zero-knowledge to the con-
current setting.
Definition 9 (Black-Box Concurrent Zero-Knowledge [20]). An interactive pro-
tocol (P,V) for language L is is black-box concurrent zero-knowledge if for all
polynomials m, there exists an expected PPT black-box simulator S m such that
for every common input x, auxiliary input z, and m-session concurrent adversar-
ial verifier V∗, the following two ensembles are computationally indistinguish-
able over x ∈ L:
{ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈
{
S V
∗(x,z)
m (x)
}
x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
As before, in the case of black-box simulation, we may assume that V∗ is
deterministic. Note that in order to simulate the view of an m-session concurrent
adversarial verifier, the simulator must have running time at least m(|x|). This is
why we allow a different simulator S m for each polynomial m.
A related notion is bounded concurrent zero-knowledge, where the proto-
col is only secure if the number of concurrent sessions is less than some a priori
bound.
Definition 10 (Bounded Concurrent Zero-Knowledge [3]). Let Π = (P,V) be an
interactive protocol for a language L, and let m be a polynomial. Π is m-bounded
concurrent zero-knowledge if for any m-session concurrent adversarial verifier
V∗, there exists an expected PPT black-box simulator S such that for every com-
mon input x, auxiliary input z, the following two ensembles are computationally
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indistinguishable over x ∈ L:
{ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈ {S (x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
Definition 11 (Black-Box Bounded Concurrent Zero-Knowledge). Let Π = (P,V)
be an interactive protocol for a language L, and let m be a polynomial. Π is
black-box m-bounded concurrent zero-knowledge if there exists an expected
PPT black-box simulator S such that for every common input x, auxiliary input
z, and m-session concurrent adversarial verifier V∗, the following two ensembles
are computationally indistinguishable over x ∈ L:
{ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈
{
S V
∗(x,z)(x)
}
x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
It goes without saying the bounded concurrency is a weaker security guar-
antee than normal (full) concurrency.
1.2.2 Parallel Zero-Knowledge
Sometimes we are content with zero-knowledge protocols that stay secure un-
der parallel composition (instead of full concurrent composition). An m-session
parallel adversarial verifier V∗ is PPT machine that, on common input x and
auxiliary input z, interacts with m(|x|) independent sessions of P in parallel (i.e.,
V∗ interacts with Pm). While V∗ must schedule the messages of different sessions
in parallel, V∗ may still choose to abort in some sessions while continuing the
protocol in other sessions (unless the protocol is public-coin). Equivalently, we
may view V∗ as a standard (single-session) adversarial verifier for the protocol
Πm = (Pm,Vm).
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Definition 12 (Parallel Zero-knowledge). An interactive protocol Π = (P,V) for
language L is parallel zero-knowledge (resp. black-box parallel zero-knowledge)
if for every polynomial m, the protocol Πm is zero-knowledge (resp. black-box
zero-knowledge).
Definition 13 (Bounded Parallel Zero-knowledge). Given a polynomial m, an
interactive protocol Π = (P,V) for language L ism-bounded parallel zero-knowledge
(resp. black-box parallel zero-knowledge) if the protocol Πm is zero-knowledge
(resp. black-box zero-knowledge).
It goes without saying that parallel zero-knowledge is a weaker security
guarantee than concurrent zero-knowledge.
1.2.3 Precision
Given an interactive Turing machine M and a viewV of M, let TimeM(V) denote
the running time of M on viewV.
Definition 14 (Precise Concurrent Zero-Knowledge [49, 51]). An interactive pro-
tocol (P,V) for language L is precise concurrent zero-knowledge with precision
p(n, t) if there exists a polynomial q (simulation overhead) such that for every
PPT adversarial verifier V∗, there exists an expected PPT simulator S such that
the following two properties holds:
Zero-Knowledge: The following two ensembles are computationally indistin-
guishable over x ∈ L:
{ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈ {S (x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
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Precision: Let S r denote running the simulator S on random tape r, and let
TimeS r(x,z) be the running time of S r on input x and z. Then for all x ∈ L,
z ∈ {0, 1}∗ and sufficiently long r ∈ {0, 1}∗,
TimeS r(x,z) ≤ p(|x|,TimeV∗(S r(x, z))) + q(|x|)
1.2.4 Related Notions
The following types of protocols are deeply related to zero-knowledge.
Witness Indistinguishability
Witness indistinguishable protocols are not fully zero-knowledge; it is enough
that the verifier cannot distinguish between different witnesses used by the
prover. In this context, we focus on languages L ∈ NP with a corresponding
witness relation RL. Namely, we consider interactions in which on common in-
put x the prover is given a witness in RL(x). For any adversarial verifier V∗, let
ViewV∗(P(x,w),V(x, z)) be the random variable that denotes V∗’s view in an inter-
action with P, when V∗ is given auxiliary input z, P is given witness w, and both
parties are given common input x.
Definition 15 (Witness-indistinguishability). An interactive protocol (P,V) for
L ∈ NP is computationally (resp. statistically or perfectly) witness indistinguish-
able (WI) for witness relation RL if for every PPT adversarial verifier V∗, and for
every two sequences {w1x}x∈L and {w2x}x∈L, such that w1x,w2x ∈ RL(x) for every x ∈ L,
the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over x ∈ L (resp.
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statistically indistinguishable over x ∈ L, or perfectly identical):
{
ViewV∗(P(x,w1x),V
∗(x, z))
}
x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈
{
ViewV∗(P(x,w2x),V
∗(x, z))
}
x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
Proofs and Arguments of Knowledge
Given a language L ∈ NP and an instance x, a proof or argument of knowl-
edge not only convinces the verifier that x ∈ L, but also to demonstrate that the
prover possesses an NP-witness for x. This is formalized by the existence of an
extractor: given black-box access to a machine that can successfully complete
the proof or argument of knowledge on input x, the extractor can compute a
witness for x.
Definition 16 (Proofs and arguments of knowledge [23, 8]). An interactive pro-
tocol Π = (P,V) is a proof of knowledge (POK) (resp. argument of knowledge,
AOK) of language L with respect to witness relation RL if Π is indeed an inter-
active proof (resp. argument) for L. Additionally, there exists a polynomial q,
a negligible function ν, and a probabilistic oracle machine E, such that for ev-
ery interactive machine P∗ (resp. for every polynomially-sized machine P∗) and
every x ∈ L, the following holds:
If Pr[〈P∗,V〉 (x) = 1] > ν(|x|), then on input x and oracle access to
P∗(x), machine E outputs a string from the RL(x) within an expected
number of steps bounded by
q(|x|)
Pr[〈P∗,V〉 (x) = 1] − ν(|x|)
The machine E is called the knowledge extractor.
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Special Soundness
Special-sound protocols are proofs of knowledge with a very rigid and useful
structure.
Definition 17 (Special soundness [17]). A 4-round interactive proof (P,V) for
language L ∈ NP with witness relation RL is special sound (SS) with respect
to RL if (P,V) is public-coin (i.e., verifier messages are segments of its random
tape), and on input x, all verifier messages have length g(|x|) ≥ |x|.
Moreover, there exists a deterministic polynomial-time extraction procedure
X such that on input x, with all but negligible probability in |x| over the choice
of a uniform ρ ∈ {0, 1}g(|x|), for all α, β, β′, γ, γ′ such that β , β′, and (ρ, α, β, γ) and
(ρ, α, β′, γ′) are both accepting transcripts of (P,V) on input x, X(x, (ρ, α, β, γ), (ρ, α, β′, γ′))
outputs a witness w ∈ RL(x).
1.2.5 Useful Known Constructions
The following protocols are useful in our various constructions:
• 4-round computational WI and SS proofs based on one-way functions.
This can be instantiated with a parallel repetition of the Blum Hamil-
tonicity protocol [10] with 2-round statistically binding commitments con-
structed from one-way functions ([50, 35]).
• 4-round computational WI-AOK or poly(n)-round statistical WI-AOK based
on one-way functions. Again, this can be instantiated with the Blum Hamil-
tonicity protocol with the help of 2-round statistically binding commit-
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ments (this actually gives a POK) from one-way functions, or statistically
hiding commitments ([33]) from one-way functions.
• 4-round perfectWI-POK based on claw-free family of permutations. Again,
this can be instantiated with the Blum Hamiltonicity protocol with the
help of perfectly binding commitments constructed from claw-free fam-
ily of permutations (see [24, Section 4.1.1]).
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CHAPTER 2
CONCURRENT ZERO KNOWLEDGE, REVISITED
In the grand scheme of cryptography, concurrent security has been an active
area of research, following the seminal works of [19, 23] from the early 90’s.
Yet, it is still not well-understood when and how concurrent security can be
achieved. One potential reason for this might be the complexity of traditional
analyses; In this chapter, we focus on generalizing and (in our eyes) simplifying
the analysis of concurrent security in one of the most basic settings, namely that
of zero-knowledge protocols.
It is no secret that cZK protocols are much harder to construct and analyze
then standalone ZK protocols. Since their introduction by Dwork, Naor and
Sahai [20], Richardson and Kilian [64] constructed the first concurrent ZK argu-
ment in the standard model without any extra set-up assumptions (the focus of
this chapter). Their protocol, which uses a black-box simulator, requires O(n)
number of rounds. (See also the work of Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser and
Micali [13] for a somewhat different and more detailed analysis of this proto-
col.) Kilian and Petrank [42] then introduced a new oblivious concurrent zero-
knowledge simulator. Using this simulation technique they obtained a simpler
and cleaner analysis, and additionally improved the round complexity of cZK
protocols to O˜(log2 n). Finally, the work of Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai [61]
further simplifies and improves the analysis of the oblivious simulator, obtain-
ing an the round complexity O˜(log n). This is essentially optimal given the work
of Canetti, Kilian, Petrank and Rosen [14] (building on earlier works by [43]
[65]), which shows that black-box cZK protocols for non-trivial languages re-
quire at least Ω˜(log n) number of rounds.
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Despite these simplifications and improvements, the analysis of concurrent
zero-knowledge protocols remains quite complex. Furthermore, the different
analyses are tailored to different types of protocols. In particular, the most
refined analysis from [61] only seems to apply to committed-verifier protocols,
where the verifier commits to its messages in advance; more specifically, as
far as we know, the analysis has only been applied to generalizations of the
Goldreich-Kahan ZK protocol [26]. For instance, no generalizations of the Feige-
Shamir ZK protocol [23] have been analyzed using it; apart from theoretical in-
terests, the Feige-Shamir ZK protocol is noteworthy due to its efficient instanti-
ation via “sigma protocols” [17].
In this work, we focus on simplifying and generalizing current analysis tech-
niques for concurrent ZK. More precisely, we provide a variant of Prabhakaran,
Rosen and Sahai’s (PRS) analysis [61] of the Kilian-Petrank (KP) zero-knowledge
simulator [42]. Our contribution is twofold:
• In our eyes, this analysis is simpler and more flexible than the original
PRS analysis. In particular, the analysis also directly applies to more ef-
ficient variants of the KP-simulator, resulting in concurrent ZK protocols
with “tight” [28, 24], and even “precise” [49] simulations (i.e., simulations
where the running-time of the simulator is close to the running-time of
the malicious verifier, in an execution-by-execution manner). We already
achieve precision in a joint work with Pandey et. al. [51], but that requires
a more elaborate analysis (building upon [61]). In Section 2.3, we show
how to construct precise concurrent zero-knowledge arguments more eas-
ily using the analysis presented in this chapter.
• Our analysis applies to a broader range of protocols, and in particular to
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“Feige-Shamir”-type protocols.1 As a consequence, we establish a simple
ω(log n)-round concurrent zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for NP
based on one-way functions. The same protocol construction also yields
a poly(n)-round concurrent statistical ZK argument of knowledge for NP,
based on one-way functions (concurrent statistical ZK arguments were
first constructed in [32] using a more complex protocol). Furthermore,
a joint work with Lin et. al. [44] relies on our analysis to construct concur-
rent non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs for NP; our analysis is seemingly
necessary for their proof, as their protocol is not of the committed-verifier
type.
Previous techniques. Kilian and Petrank’s (KP) ingenious simulation tech-
nique relies on a static—and oblivious—rewinding schedule; namely, the sim-
ulator rewinds the adversarial verifier after some fixed number of messages,
independent of the content of the messages and the interleaving schedule of the
sessions. The crux of their analysis is to show that using this rewinding sched-
ule, every session is “successfully rewound” at least once with high probability;
in a successful rewind, the simulator can extract a “trapdoor” that will allow
it to complete the simulation. To bound the failure probability, they rely on a
subtle computation of conditional probabilities.
The elegant work of Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai (PRS) [61, 66, 62], on the
other hand, directly analyze the probability space of the simulator, i.e., count
the random tapes of the simulator; this makes the analysis both simpler and
sharper. The idea is to show that each “bad” random tape (that produces a
1It would seem that the analyses of [64] or [42] could also be applied to “Feige-Shamir”-type
protocols, but this would result in protocols with sub-optimal round complexity.
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failed simulation) can be mapped into super-polynomially many distinct “good”
tapes. This is done by identifying random tape segments, called rewinding inter-
vals, that can be “swapped” among each other in order to turn a bad tape into
a good one2. The crux of their proof is then to count how many such “swap-
pings” actually generate new and distinct random tapes. However, complica-
tions arise because swappings performed on different rewinding intervals may
overlap and even remove other possible rewinding intervals. Due to these is-
sues, the PRS proof relies on a global analysis to lower-bound the overall num-
ber of available swappings. A bit more precisely, the PRS analysis focuses only
on “disjoint” rewinding intervals, but performs an intricate computation based
on the “multiplicity” on those intervals. A count with multiplicity is needed
because the number of disjoint rewind intervals in general could not be guaran-
teed to be sufficiently large, at least in the case of ω(log n) round protocols. (As
we shall see, in our analysis, we are able to swap also non-disjoint rewinding
intervals; as a result, we can avoid the count with multiplicities.)
Additionally, to enable this counting argument, the PRS analysis only bounds
the failure probability of a “hybrid” simulator (which has access to the witnesses
of input statements). To show that the real simulator is indistinguishable from
the hybrid simulator, committed-verifier protocols are used; this is required to
ensure that when changing the hybrid simulator (which uses the actual witness)
to the real simulator (which doesn’t know the actual witness), indistinguisha-
bility holds despite the rewinds performed by the simulator. Intuitively, the
committed-verifier property ensures that the rewinds are “harmless”.
2Here we use the terminologies from Rosen’s thesis [66].
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Our techniques. We show how to directly analyze the failure probability of
the actual simulator (as opposed to a hybrid one), while (in our eyes) simpli-
fying the counting argument. Our key step is to identify a stronger notion of
rewinding intervals, which we call composable blocks. Just like rewinding in-
tervals, properties of composable blocks guarantee that a “swap” will generate
a new good random tape; moreover, these same properties are closed under
composition—namely the swapping of one such block leaves other composable
blocks intact, even if these composable blocks are not disjoint. By this new com-
position property, it is enough to identify K composable blocks to conclude that
the simulation fails with probability less than 2−K .
In essence, our proof will consist of two simple steps: First, we establish local
properties of a composable block (namely that a swap generates one new good
random tape, and that swappings are composable); then, we count the num-
ber of composable blocks on a bad random tape; as we shall see, each round in
the protocol gives rise to a new composable block. As such, our analysis con-
veys a strong intuition of how “each additional round of the protocol halves the
simulator’s failing probability”. However, we emphasize that our techniques
do not improve the “quantity” of the count (e.g., does not improve upon the
round-complexity of the PRS protocol).
To employ this new notion of composable blocks, we consider and analyze a
“lazy” variant of the KP simulator. Intuitively, the lazy KP simulator is identical
to the KP simulator but only makes use of information gathered in its rewinds
after some delay. The lazy KP simulator can only fail more often than the orig-
inal KP simulator (and thus our analysis indirectly also applies to the KP sim-
ulator); yet, considering this “weaker” simulator enables our way of directly
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analyzing the failure probability of the simulation. In a sense, much like mak-
ing a stronger inductive hypothesis can simplify the inductive step, our stronger
notion of composable blocks and our weaker lazy KP simulator enable and sim-
plify the analysis.
After directly bounding the failure probability of the real simulator, we pro-
vide a simple hybrid argument to show that the output of the simulator is indis-
tinguishable from the view of the verifier. The base case of this hybrid argument
considers only a “straight-line” (i.e., a non-rewinding) execution, and as such
the analysis is not limited to committed-verifier protocols.
Overview. In this chapter we re-prove the following theorem (first shown in
[61, 32]).
Theorem 1. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then every language in NP
has a ω(log n)-round concurrent black-box ZK argument of knowledge, and a poly(n)-
round concurrent black-box statistical-ZK argument of knowledge.
We describe our protocol in Section 2.1, and our simulator in Section 2.2.
Using the same analysis, we discuss how to achieve precise cZK in Section 2.3.
For completeness, we also provide a brief comparison with the PRS [61] analysis
in Section 2.4.
2.1 The Protocol
Our concurrent ZK protocol ConcZKArg (also used in [59]) is a slight variant of
the precise ZK protocol of [49], which in turn is a generalization of the Feige-
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Shamir protocol [23]. The protocol for language L proceeds in three stages,
given a security parameter n, a common input statement x ∈ {0, 1}n, and a
“round-parameter” k ∈ ω(log n):
Stage Init: The verifier picks two random strings r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}n and sends their
images c1 = f (r1), c2 = f (r2) through a one-way function f to the prover.
The verifier then provides, in parallel, k instances of a 4-round computationally-
WI and SS proof of knowledge of the NP statement “c1 or c2 is in the image
set of f” (a witness here would be a pre-image of c1 or c2). The first two
(out of four) messages of each SS-POK are exchanged in this stage. The
end of Stage Init is called the start of the protocol.
Stage 1: k message exchanges occur in Stage 1. In the jth iteration, the prover
sends β j ∈ {0, 1}n, a random second last message of the jth SS-POK, and the
verifier replies with the last message γ j of the SS-POK. These k iterations
are called slots. A slot is convincing if the verifier produces an accepting
proof. If there is ever an unconvincing slot, the prover aborts the whole
session. The end of Stage 1 (after k convincing slots) is called the end of
the protocol.
Stage 2: The prover provides a 4-round computational-WI (resp. poly(n)-round
statistical-WI) argument of knowledge of the statement “x ∈ L, or one of c1
or c2 is in the image set of f”.
Completeness and soundness/proof of knowledge follows directly from the
proof of Feige and Shamir [23]; in fact, the protocol is an instantiation of theirs.
Intuitively, to cheat in the protocol a prover must “know” an inverse to c1 or
c2 (since Stage 2 is an argument of knowledge), which requires inverting the
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Protocol ConcZKArg:
Common Input: an instance x of a language L with witness relation RL.
Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that (x,w) ∈ RL(x).
Stage Init:
V uniformly chooses r1, r2 ∈ {0, 1}n.
V → P: c1 = f (r1), c2 = f (r2) for a one-way function f .
V ↔ P: Exchange in parallel (interactively) the first two messages ~α1, . . . , ~αk
of k copies of 4-round computational-WI and SS proofs on common
input (c1, c2) with respect to the witness relation:
R f (c1, c2) = {r : f (r) = c1 or f (r) = c2}
Note that V acts as the prover in these SS-POK’s.
We say the protocol has reached start (of Stage 1) if all messages in Stage Init are
exchanged.
Stage 1: For j = 1 to k do the following (called a slot)
P→ V : The second last message β j ← {0, 1}n of the jth SS-POK.
V → P: The last message γ j of the jth SS-POK.
We say the protocol has reached end (of Stage 1) if all k SS-POK are accepted.
Stage 2:
P ↔ V : a 4-round computational-WI (or poly(n)-round statistical WI) argu-
ment of knowledge from P to V on common input (c1, c2, x) with respect
to the witness relation:
R f∨L(c1, c2, x) =
{
(r,w) : r ∈ R f (c1, c2) or w ∈ RL(x)
}
Figure 2.1: Concurrent ZK argument of knowledge for NP with round parame-
ter k.
one-way function f . A formal description of protocol ConcZKArg is shown in
Figure 2.1.
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2.2 The “Lazy KP” ZK simulator
We show that whenever k is super logarithmic (i.e. k = ω(log n)), our protocol
is concurrent ZK. This requires us to construct a simulator Sim = SimV
∗(x,z)(x)
that given input instance x ∈ L and black-box access to V∗(x, z), outputs a view
that is indistinguishable from the real view of V∗(x, z). On a very high-level, the
simulation follows that of Richardson and Kilian [64]. The simulator simulates
Stage Init and Stage 1 of the protocol by following the honest prover strategy,
and attempts to rewind one of the slots (i.e. the last two messages of the special-
sound proofs provided by V∗). If the simulator obtains two matching convincing
slots, i.e., the slots are from the same round of the protocol and share the same
initial transcript, the special-soundness property allows the simulator to com-
pute a fake witness r such that f (r) = c1 or c2. This fake witness can then be
used to simulate Stage 2 of the protocol. Towards this goal, we let Sim be an
oblivious black-box simulator similar to [42].
Description of Sim. Let n be the security parameter, m be a bound on the num-
ber of concurrent sessions invoked by V∗ and T be the total number of messages
exchanged, bounded by O(mk), a polynomial in n. Keep in mind that during
black-box simulation, we assume without loss of generality that V∗ is determin-
istic; therefore the view of V∗ is just the transcript of its interaction with the
honest prover.
In order to extract a fake witness from V∗, Sim follows an oblivious rewind-
ing schedule based only on the number of messages exchanged so far, just like
in [42] and [61]. During the oblivious simulation, Sim keeps a repository of all
messages generated by V∗ among all rewinds; whenever Sim encounters Stage
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2 of the protocol, Sim looks for matching convincing slots in this repository to
compute the required fake witness. More precisely, Sim uses the recursive pro-
cedure lazy-rewind described below.
At a high level, lazy-rewind(t,V,T ) → (V′,T ′) attempts to recursively sim-
ulate V∗(x, z) for t messages starting from a partial view V of V∗, with the help
of of a repository of messages generated by V∗ during rewinds, T (formally just
a set of all simulator query and verifier message pairs). If lazy-rewind is suc-
cessful, it outputs a longer view V′ of V∗ (that contains exactly t more verifier
messages than V), and an updated repository T ′ including verifier messages
that lazy-rewind gathered from various rewinds (and most likely contains more
verifier messages than what is recorded in V′). Sim simply outputs the view
produced by lazy-rewind(T,V = ∅,T = ∅), i.e., lazy-rewind starting from the
empty view and an empty repository.
Description of lazy-rewind(t, s, h). At the base case of the recursion (t = 1),
lazy-rewind receives a message from V∗ and produces a prover response. lazy-rewind
behaves identically to an honest prover to generate Stage Init and Stage 1 mes-
sages. Whenever a session reaches end, lazy-rewind will attempt to compute a
fake witness r for the session ( f (r) = c1 or c2) by searching T for matching con-
vincing slots. If this is successful, the fake witness r is used to generate prover
messages in Stage 2 of this session (i.e. the WI-POK). Otherwise, lazy-rewind out-
puts ⊥, which in turn causes Sim to output ⊥ as well.3 In the end, lazy-rewind
outputs the updated viewV′ of V∗ (the input view appended with the newly ex-
changed pair of messages), and the updated repository T ′ (the input repository
3We distinguish between legitimate failures, i.e., Sim may abort just like a prover should V∗
fail to follow the protocol, and simulation failures, i.e., Sim outputs ⊥ if it fails to compute a fake
witness r.
29
inserted with the newly exchanged pair of messages).
When t > 1, lazy-rewind(t,V,T ) proceeds roughly as follows: It first recur-
sively simulates V∗ for t/2 messages twice starting from the partial view V.
Then, continuing from one of those simulations, lazy-rewind recursively sim-
ulates V∗ for another t/2 messages, twice. More formally, lazy-rewind(t,V,T )
calls itself four times as follows:
1. (V1,T1)← lazy-rewind(t/2,V,T ).
2. (V2,T2)← lazy-rewind(t/2,V,T ). Merge T1 and T2 into a larger repository
of messages T ′.
3. (V3,T3)← lazy-rewind(t/2,V1,T ′).
4. (V4,T4) ← lazy-rewind(t/2,V1,T ′). Merge T3 and T4 into a larger reposi-
tory of messages T ′′.
5. Output (V3,T ′′).
Because the first two recursive calls to lazy-rewind (respectively the last two
calls) have identical inputs (they differ only because they use different segments
of Sim’s random tape), they are called sibling calls. See Figure 2.2 for an illustra-
tion of the rewinding schedule, and Figure 2.3 for a pseudo-code description.
Let us describe some terminology that is useful for the analysis Sim and
lazy-rewind. Because Sim follows an oblivious rewinding schedule, it always
makes a fixed set of calls to lazy-rewind at fixed moments in the simulation, and
it always “connects” these calls of lazy-rewind in a fixed way to generate partial
views of V∗. Intuitively, a thread is one of these fixed connections.
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messages exchanged
with V∗
siblings
V V1 V3
output thread
0 t/2 t
Figure 2.2: A pictorial representation of the rewinding schedule of lazy-rewind.
The boxes represent blocks, and the lines represent threads. If this is
the top level call (i.e., lazy-rewind(T, ∅, ∅)), then the thicker thread is
the output thread, whose view is the output of Sim.
Definition 18 (Threads). A thread is a sequence of 0’s and 1’s; from the begin-
ning of the simulation, this sequence specifies, whenever a pair of sibling calls
are encountered, whether to follow the first or second sibling call of lazy-rewind,
respectively. (A sequence may terminate prematurely to specify a “partial”
thread.) The thread 00 · · · 0 (of sufficient length) is the thread that follows the
first sibling calls to the end of the simulation, and is called the output thread
because the view of V∗ generated on this thread is the output of Sim.
Given an execution of Sim (on an input x ∈ L and a random tape), a block
intuitively refers to the “location” (in the static rewinding schedule) of a call to
lazy-rewind, as well as the actual simulation performed by the call.
Definition 19 (Blocks). Given an execution of Sim, a block B is a pair B =
(Bloc, Bcontent), where Bloc specifies the location of a call of lazy-rewind and Bcontent
specifies the inputs and randomness of the same call. Formally Bloc is a partial
thread (that leads to and includes the lazy-rewind call), and Bcontent is just the
inputs and random tape used by the lazy-rewind call, i.e., (t,V,T , r). We say a
block C is contained in block B if the recursive call of lazy-rewind correspond-
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lazy-rewind(t,V,T ):
1. Base Case: t = 1. Exchange one pair of messages with V∗.
(a) If the next scheduled message is from an aborted session where V∗ has
deviated from the protocol (e.g., there has been an unconvincing slot),
return (V‖abort,T ) (i.e. do nothing).
(b) If the next scheduled message is a Stage Init or Stage 1 prover message
for session i, compute a message p following the honest prover strategy.
Let v be the response of V∗; if v deviates from the protocol (e.g., v is an
unconvincing last message of a SS-POK) abort session i.
(c) If the next scheduled message is a Stage 2 prover message for session
i, use the computed fake witness to compute the prover messages p for
the WI−AOK, and let v be the verifier response. Note that a fake witness
must have already been computed to reach this point in the simulation;
see next bullet.
(d) After exchanging a pair of messages p and v, if we reach the end of
a session, attempt to compute a fake witness of the session using the
special-soundness property and previous messages stored in the repos-
itory T (in particular are looking for matching convincing slots for ses-
sion i). If lazy-rewind fails to compute a fake witness, output ⊥.
(e) Output (V‖p‖v,T ∪ {V‖p‖v}), i.e., extend the input partial view with
the message pair (p, v) and enlarge the input repository with the new
message generated by V∗.
2. Recursive step
# Simulate the first t/2 messages twice
(a) (V1,T1)← lazy-rewind(t/2,V,T )
(b) (V2,T2)← lazy-rewind(t/2,V,T )
# Simulate the second t/2 messages twice
(c) (V3,T3)← lazy-rewind(t/2,V,T1 ∪ T2)
(d) (V4,T4)← lazy-rewind(t/2,V,T1 ∪ T2)
(e) output (V3, h3 ∪ h4)
Figure 2.3: The recursive procedure used by Sim—the “lazy” KP simulator.
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ing to block C is nested inside the recursive call of lazy-rewind corresponding to
block B.
Due to the recursive nature of lazy-rewind, every block would contain four
“smaller” blocks; of these four blocks, we call the first pair (respectively the sec-
ond pair) sibling blocks, as they correspond to sibling calls of lazy-rewind. Fi-
nally, we say a block contains a thread if the thread “passes through” the block.
Definition 20 (Threads in a Block). Given an execution of Sim, we say a block B
contains a thread h if Bloc is a prefix of h.
Since lazy-rewind does not update the message repository T between sibling
recursive calls (sibling blocks) we call it lazy. This departs from previous works
such as [42, 61]4. We have also changed how blocks are threaded together from
[42, 61]. In lazy-rewind, the second pair of recursive calls are continued from the
first recursive call of the first pair (i.e. continued from viewV1). This is similar to
the precise simulation of [49] and [51] (and will be useful later when we discuss
precision in Section 2.3); [42] and [61], in contrast, continue the recursive calls
from the view V2. Due to the new symmetry introduced by lazy simulation,
either choice will work with our analysis. See Figure 2.2 for an illustration of
blocks, threads and siblings in an execution of lazy-rewind.
2.2.1 Proof Overview
In order to prove the correctness of the simulation, we need to show that for
every adversarial verifier V∗, the simulator runs in polynomial time and the
4This extra symmetry is part of what enables us to analyze the Sim directly (as opposed to a
“hybrid” simulator as in [61]); see Section 2.4 for a comparison.
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output distribution is “correct”. The running time of Sim can be bound just
as in [42, 61]. Sim spends a maximum of poly(n) time on responding to each
verifier message. It follows from the recursive structure of the simulator that
the number of messages exchanged is doubled for each level of the recursion;
since we have a recursive depth of log2 T , the running time of the simulator is
bounded by poly(n) · T · 2log2 T = poly(n) · T 2 = poly(n).
Intuitively, the correctness of the output view follows from the fact that Sim
chooses Stage Init and Stage 1 messages honestly, and that the protocol used in
Stage 2 is witness indistinguishable (this requires a proof later since Sim per-
forms rewinds). Therefore, as long as Sim gets stuck (outputs ⊥) with negligible
probability, taken over the random tapes of Sim (the random tape of V∗ is fixed
during black box simulation), the output distribution is correct. Towards this
goal we will show that the probability of getting stuck at any point in the simu-
lation is negligible.
Recall that Sim can only get stuck on a particular thread when the simu-
lation reaches the end of some session and could not extract the fake witness.
Following the approach of [61], we show that the probability of getting stuck on
any session and any thread is negligible. Since there are only polynomially many
sessions and threads, the main theorem follows by the union bound.
Fix any thread h and session i; from now on we refer to it as the “main”
thread and the “main” session, and call all other threads and sessions “auxil-
iary”. We say a random tape of Sim is bad if Sim gets stuck at the end of main
session i on the main thread thread h; all other random tapes are called good (in-
cluding those that got stuck on an auxiliary session or thread). The high-level
idea, just like in [61], is to show that for every bad random tape, there exists
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super-polynomially many good random tapes. Furthermore, the good tapes
corresponding to any two bad tapes are disjoint. Hence the probability of a tape
being bad is negligible. From here on, start and end refer to those on the main
session and thread unless otherwise noted.
Here is how we generate good random tapes from bad ones. Recall that
on a bad tape, the simulator reaches end without extracting a “fake witness”.
Hence, all slots on the main thread are convincing (or else we would never
reach end), but no corresponding convincing slots are on an auxiliary thread
prior to end (since otherwise Sim would have extracted a witness). Intuitively,
to generate a good tape from a bad one we just need to “swap” a convincing
slot from the main thread into an auxiliary thread. After the swapping, should
the simulation reaches end of the main session on the main thread, the newly
formed convincing slot on the auxiliary thread, together with the corresponding
convincing slot on the main thread, will allow Sim to compute the fake witness.
Hence the simulation may continue on without getting stuck. So far we have
not deviated from the analysis of [61].
To actually “swap” convincing slots, we modify the random tape of Sim.
The basic operation that we perform on the random tape is to exchange the
randomness used by sibling blocks (i.e., the segments of the random tape used
to simulate these blocks). Since sibling blocks are identical modulo random-
ness, swapping the random tape between siblings swaps the simulation result
in the two blocks exactly. (In the rest of the paper, we use the convention that
after swapping a block B with its sibling B′, the “new block B” refers to the
block in the old location of B′ with the same content as the “old block B”, i.e.,
(B′loc, Bcontent).) Note that this “exact swap” property is made possible by the lazy
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nature of Sim; the same property does not hold for the KP simulator where the
second sibling benefits from fake witnesses extracted during the execution of
the first sibling.
Intuitively, we call a block on the main thread composable if it satisfies the
following properties:
Goodness. Swapping a composable block with its sibling produces a good ran-
dom tape.
Composability. The above swap leaves other composable blocks on the main
thread composable.
Reversibility. Given the random tape obtained after swapping a composable
block, there is a procedure undo that reverses the swap. This ensures that
the resulting good tape is unique.
Consider K composable blocks with an ordering such that each swap will
leave the successive composable blocks still composable. Then, we can generate
2K−1 good random tapes by choosing to swap each block or not in the ordering.
By a simple counting argument, we will show that for any bad tape, there are
k − 2 log2 T composable blocks with an ordering, therefore generating 2k−2 log2 T
distinct good tapes. We then use the undo procedure to show that different
bad tapes generate different good tapes. Thus, if k ∈ ω(log2 T ) = ω(log n), the
probability of having a bad tape is negligible.
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2.2.2 The Actual Proof
Formally, Sim may output ⊥ for two reasons. Firstly, it may reach end without
encountering two matching convincing slots after the start of the session; we
call this a rewinding failure. Secondly, Sim may not be able to compute a fake
witness even though it has access to matching special-sound transcripts; we call
this a special-sound failure. Special-sound failures are easy to upper bound; see
Claim 8. As mentioned, the main part of the proof is bounding the probability
of rewinding failures.
Composable Blocks
We first define the notion of composable blocks and show that they satisfy the
three properties of goodness, composability and reversibility. Let us fix a particular
main session and main thread, and formally define a random tape to be bad
if Sim encounters a rewinding failure in the main session on the main thread;
otherwise a random tape is good. From here on start and end refers to those of
the main session and main thread, unless otherwise noted.
Definition 21 (Composable Block). Consider an execution of Sim with any ran-
dom tape (not necessarily bad). A block B, with sibling B′, is called a com-
posable block (with respect to the main thread and session), if it satisfies the
following conditions:
Main block condition: B contains the main thread h, a convincing slot of the
main session (not necessarily on the main thread) and does not contain
start (of the main session on the main thread). The last condition is equiv-
alent to saying that the prefix of B contains start.
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Sibling condition: B′ does not contain any end (of the main session on the main
thread).
Tracing condition: The simulation after start but before B contains only convinc-
ing slots on the main thread h, and contains no convincing slots on the
auxiliary threads.
As we will soon see, the Main block condition and the Sibling condition im-
plies goodness and composability, while the Tracing condition enables the undo
procedure, which implies reversibility. We also define an ordering relation > on
composable blocks.
Definition 22. Let C and B be two blocks on a common thread. We write C > B
iff
• C and B are disjoint, and C occurs before B (Case 1 in Figure 2.4), or
• C and B are not disjoint, and C is a larger block that contains B (Case 2 in
Figure 2.4)
Note that given two blocks on the same thread, if they are not disjoint, then one
must contain another. Thus > is a total order on any set of blocks that share a
common thread.
Finally, we define a deterministic undo function on random tapes in order to
achieve reversibility:
• Given a random tape τ′, execute lazy-rewind with the tape τ′. Call a block
that does not contain the main thread special if it contains a convincing slot
of the main session.
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• Let D be the first special block after start; that is, any other special block E
after start satisfies D > E. Swap the parts of τ′ used by D and its sibling,
and output the new random tape.
Claim 2. Let τ be a random tape (not necessarily bad). Let B be a composable block
with sibling B′ when lazy-rewind is executed with random tape τ, and letV be the com-
mon prefix of B and B′. Furthermore, let τ′ be the random tape obtained after swapping
the blocks B and B′. Then:
1. [Goodness]: τ′ is a good random tape.
2. [Composability]: Any composable block C on τ with C > B is still compos-
able on τ′.
3. [Reversibility]: undo(τ′) = τ.
Proof. Recall that after the swapping, blocks B and B′ are exchanged in the sim-
ulation.
Goodness When lazy-rewind is executed with τ′, B′ will now be on the main
thread (see Figure 2.4). Recall that B′ does not contain any end of the main
session (sibling condition). Thus, if the end of the main session ever occurs
on the main thread, it will occur after both B and B′ are executed. In that
case, both the convincing slot in B (which is now in an auxiliary thread)
and the corresponding convincing slot on the main thread (which must
be there before end occurs) together forms a matching pair of convincing
slots that occurs after start.
Moreover, this pair of convincing slots occur before end. Thus τ′ is a good
tape.
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Case 1: C occurs before B
B′
B
start
VC
Case 2: C contains B
B′
B
start
V
C
Figure 2.4: Two possible block diagrams after the swapping procedure in
Claim 2 (B and B′ is swapped). The main thread is shown in a thick
line, and a composable block C > B, drawn with dashed lines, is
shown in two possible configurations.
Composability Given a composable block C > B with sibling C′ on τ, we have
two cases as shown in Figure 2.4. In case 1, when C is disjoint from B,
the swapping of B and B′ does not change the simulation inside C, C′, and
between start andC. Respectively, this leaves themain block condition, sib-
ling condition, and tracing condition of C intact on τ′. On the other hand, in
case 2 whereC contains B, the swapping of B and B′ again leaves the simu-
lation inside C′ (not shown) and between start and C unchanged, keeping
the sibling condition and tracing condition intact. In addition, since C still
contains B under τ′, and B in turn contains a convincing slot, the main
block condition still holds as well (other parts of C may have changed). In
both cases, C continues to be a composable block on τ′.
Reversibility Finally, we need to show that undo(τ′) = τ. After the swap (exe-
cuting with random tape τ′), block B no longer contains the main thread
and contains a convincing slot; it is therefore a special block. Next we
show that any block C > B is not special. Either C occurs strictly before
B, or it contains B (in this case C also contains B′). In the first case, block
C is unchanged during the swap, and therefore is not special because it
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does not contain a convincing slot (tracing condition). In the second case,
since C contains B′ and therefore the main thread, it is not special. Thus,
undo will always locate B as the first special block and perform the correct
inverse swapping to recover τ.5 
The next claim demonstrates how to compose multiple composable blocks.
Claim 3. Let τ be a bad random tape, B = {B1, . . . , Bp} be a set of composable blocks
for τ. Then, we can generate a set of good random tapes, S (τ,B), by swapping the
various composable blocks in B, so that the following holds:
1. |S (τ,B)| ≥ 2p − 1.
2. For any bad tape τ′ , τ and any set of composable blocks B′ for τ′, S (τ,B) ∩
S (τ′,B′) = ∅.
Proof. Since all composable blocks lie on the main thread, there is a total or-
dering of the blocks. Without loss of generality, let B1 > B2 · · · > Bp. Consider
any non-empty subsequence of 1, . . . , p, say u1, . . . , uq. There are 2p − 1 such se-
quences. Let τu1···uq be the random tapes obtained from τ by swapping the blocks
Bui with its sibling, in the order of i = q, q − 1, . . . , 1.
From Claim 2, it follows that τu1···uq is a good random tape. We further note
that given τu1···uq , we can recover the blocks Bu1 , . . . Buq by repeatedly applying
undo until we reach a bad tape (it will always be τ). Therefore given two differ-
ent subsequences, u1, . . . , uq and v1, . . . , vq′ , we must have τu1···uq , τv1···vq′ in order
5 Note that we here rely on the “exact” swapping of sibling blocks (a consequence of the lazy
property of Sim). Suppose that sibling blocks are not symmetric and that the second sibling
uses information obtained in the first sibling to compute fake witnesses. Then, if the end of an
auxiliary session occurs before the convincing slot in B′, it may now output⊥ after the swapping
(since it has lost the information collected in B after the swap). In this case, block B would not
exist when executing Sim with random tape τ′, and undo would fail.
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for undo to recover a different set of swapped blocks. Thus, we obtain 2p − 1
distinct good random tapes.
Similarly, take any α ∈ S (τ,B) and β ∈ S (τ′,B′) (good tapes produced by
swapping from τ and τ′, respectively). Applying undo repeatedly on α until the
result is a bad tape will result in τ, while applying the same procedure on β will
give τ′. If τ , τ′, then we must have α , β. 
Corollary 4. Suppose every bad random tape has p composable blocks. Then, the
probability of a random tape being bad is at most 1/2p
Number of Composable Blocks
We now proceed to count the number of composable blocks. First we introduce
the notion of minimal containing blocks (this is identical to minimal rewinding
intervals as defined by [61]). For each slot, its minimal containing block is the
minimal block on the main thread that contains the slot. Claims 5 and 6 below
together show that there are at least k − 2 logT composable blocks when we run
Sim with a bad tape. Claim 5, which counts the number of minimal containing
blocks, is identical to [61]; we include it here for completeness.
Claim 5. In an execution of Sim with a bad random tape, there are at least k minimal
containing blocks.
Proof. As observed earlier, on a bad tape there will be k convincing slots of the
main session on the main thread (in order to reach end). We merely need to
show that for each slot, its respective minimal containing blocks are distinct.
Suppose that two slots share the same minimal containing block of length t.
Since slots on the same thread are disjoint, we reach a contradiction as one of
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the slots must be properly contained in one of the two smaller blocks of size
t/2. 
Claim 6. Consider an execution of Sim with a bad random tape τ. If there are k′
minimal containing block, then there are at least k′ − 2 logT composable blocks.
Proof. Let B be a minimal containing block that does not contain start or end.
Since start (or end) can only be in at most logT different blocks on the main
thread (since that is the recursion depth), we conclude that there are at least
k′ − 2 logT such blocks.6 It remains to show that B is a composable block. Let B′
be the sibling of B.
The main block condition of composable blocks follows directly, while the
tracing condition on the main thread actually holds for the whole simulation
from start to end, since τ is a bad random tape. Thus, we only need to show
that the sibling condition is satisfied, i.e. B′ does not contain end. Assume to the
contrary that B′ does contain end. Since B and B′ are siblings with a common
starting point and B contains a slot of the main session, B′ must contain that
same slot in a convincing manner in order to reach end. On the other hand, B
does not contain end. Thus B′ will be executed before the main thread reaches
end (if at all), and this convincing slot will allow Sim to compute the witness of
the main session by the same argument in Claim 2. This contradicts the fact that
τ is a bad tape. 
6This is the same counting argument used in [61] to count minimal rewinding intervals with-
out start or end.
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Concluding the Proof
We first show that Sim gets stuck with negligible probability, and then use it
in Claim 9 to conclude that the output distribution of SimV
∗
is computationally
(resp. statistically) indistinguishable from the real view of V∗.
Claim 7. Sim encounters rewinding failures with negligible probability.
Proof. As mentioned before, since there are only polynomially many sessions
and threads, it suffices to show that the probability of the simulator getting stuck
on any fixed thread and session is negligible. The union bound then shows that
Sim overall gets stuck with negligible probability
For any fixed thread and session, combining Claim 3, 5 and 6 shows that a
random tape is bad with probability at most
1
2k−2 logT
This is negligible in n since T is polynomial in n and k = ω(log n). 
Claim 8. Sim encounters special-sound failures with negligible probability.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that Sim encounters special-sound
failures with non-negligible probability. Consider an unbounded adversarial
prover P∗ that forwards the prover messages of the prefix of the SS-POK (Stage
Init), in a random session and random thread from an execution of SimV
∗
, to an
outside honest verifier VS S of the SS-POK (essentially we are forwarding mes-
sages between V∗, who acts as the prover of the SS-POK in Stage Init, to the
outside honest verifier VS S ). Since an execution of Sim
V∗ only has polynomially
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many instances of Stage Init, P∗ would contradict the special-soundness prop-
erty with non-negligible probability (i.e., produce a prefix of the SS-POK where
is it possible for the witness-computing procedure to fail, even when supplied
with two different completions of the prefix).
The actual “forwarding” procedure of P∗ has a subtlety due to the rewinding
nature of Sim. In the middle of forwarding the prefix of a SS-POK from V∗ to
VS S , Sim may decide to rewind V∗ partially to an earlier point in the SS-POK
proof. In a naive forwarding scheme, this would require VS S to be rewound as
well to generate fresh verifier messages (which cannot be done). Fortunately,
since the prefix of our SS protocol has only 2 messages (non-interactive), such a
rewinding cannot occur. 
Claim 9. If the argument of knowledge in Stage 2 is WI (resp. statistical WI), then the
ensembles {ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ and
{
S V
∗(x,z)(x)
}
x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ are computation-
ally (resp. statistically) indistinguishable over x ∈ L.
Proof. We consider polynomially many intermediate hybrids Simi, 0 ≤ i ≤ m+1,
that receive the real witnesses to the statements x1, . . . , xm. Simi proceeds as Sim
until the ith Stage 2 proof on the output thread, after which Simi continues in a
straight-line simulation with V∗ using the real witnesses for Stage 2 proofs. Simi
will output ⊥, however, should Sim encounter a rewinding or special-sound
failure during the ith proof. Clearly, Sim0 generates ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z)) and
Simm+1 generates S V
∗(x,z)(x). Thus, it is enough to show that for all i, the output
of Simi and Simi+1, are computationally (resp. statistically) indistinguishable.
We introduce yet another hybrid Sim′i that proceeds as Simi except that it
utilizes the extracted fake witness for the ith proof. Sim′i and Simi+1 differ only
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in that Simi+1 has more chances to output ⊥. But by Claim 7 and 8, both ac-
tually outputs ⊥ with negligible probability, and therefore they are statistically
close. On the other hand, Simi and Sim
′
i differ only in the ith proof, which both
simulators run in a straight-line fashion, without rewinds. Therefore they are
computationally (resp. statistically) indistinguishable by the WI property of the
Stage 2 proof. Thus, the output of Simi and Simi+1 are indeed computationally
(resp. statistically) indistinguishable. 
Claim 9 completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Remark. Since we have shown that our lazy simulator is a concurrent zero-
knowledge simulator, it follows directly that the KP simulator is also a concur-
rent zero-knowledge simulator: because the KP simulator receives more infor-
mation than the lazy simulator at any point during the simulation (i.e. a bigger
history repository h), the probability that the KP simulator outputs ⊥ is no more
than the probability that the lazy simulator outputs⊥. Thus, the same argument
presented in Claim 9 can be applied also to the KP simulator.
2.2.3 Improving the Running Time of the Simulator
A faster simulator gives tighter “knowledge security” [28, 24]. In this section,
we bound the running time Sim by bounding the number of queries the Sim
makes to V∗. Recall that T is the maximum number of queries needed in a
straight-line execution of V∗. This means the recursive depth of lazy-rewind(T, ·, ·)
invoked by Sim is at most log2 T . Since lazy-rewind doubles the number of
queries per recursive depth, Sim makes at most T2log2 T = T 2 queries.
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We can reduce the number of queries by following the approach of [51].
Currently, when lazy-rewind is asked to simulate t messages (a block of size
t), it divides the t messages into two halves and recursively calls itself on each
half (creating blocks of size t/2). One approach would be for lazy-rewind to
divide each block into smaller sub-blocks, thus reducing the recursive depth.
For example, an illustration of dividing a block into 3 equal parts is shown
in Figure 2.5 (this means lazy-rewind(t, ·, ·) would make 6 recursive calls of the
form lazy-rewind(t/3, ·, ·)). Suppose we divide each block into g equal sized sub-
blocks; we call g the splitting factor. Then it immediately follows that the recur-
sive depth of lazy-rewind(T, ·, ·) becomes logg T , and the number of queries made
by Sim is reduced to at most T2logg T .
Figure 2.5: A pictorial representation of a rewinding schedule with splitting fac-
tor 3.
Now that the Sim is making less queries overall, can it still successfully gen-
erate a view of V∗? It is easy to see that the combinatorial properties of compos-
able blocks do not change with this generalized rewinding scheme. Therefore,
we only need to count the number of composable blocks in this new rewind-
ing schedule to bound Sim’s failure probability. As in Section 2.2.2, we start by
counting the number of minimal containing blocks. The following two claims
mirror Claim 5 and 6:
Claim 10. In an execution of Sim with splitting factor g on a bad random tape, there
are at least k/(g − 1) minimal containing blocks.
Proof. Recall that in an execution with a bad tape, there are k convincing slots
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of the main session on the main thread (in order to reach end). Since each slot
has its respective minimal containing block, and any block can be the minimal
containing block for at most g − 1 slots (by the pigeon hole principle), there are
at least k/(g − 1) minimal containing blocks. 
Claim 11. Consider an execution of Sim with splitting factor g on bad random tape τ.
If there are k′ minimal containing block, then there are at least k′−2 logg T composable
blocks.
Proof. As shown in Claim 6, it still holds that any minimal containing block that
does not contain start or end is a composable block. Since start (or end) can
only be in at most logg T different blocks on the main thread (since that is the
recursion depth), we conclude that there are at least k′ − 2 logg T composable
blocks. 
Following the claims in Section 2.2.2, we conclude that Sim with splitting
factor g is still a valid zero-knowledge simulator as long as
1
2k/(g−1)−logg T
is negligible in the security parameter n; this holds whenever k/g ∈ ω(log n).
In particular, for any ε > 0, if we set g = 21/ε and k = ω(log n), then protocol
ConcZKArg remains secure and ω(log n)-rounds, and Sim makes at most T 1+ε
queries to V∗ where T is the maximum number of queries needed in a straight-
line interaction with V∗.
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2.3 Precise Concurrent Zero-Knowledge
Zero-knowledge is formalized by requiring that the view of any adversarial ver-
ifier V∗ in an interaction with a prover can be reconstructed by an efficient PPT
simulator S , interacting with no one, on input just x. Since whatever V∗ “sees”
in the interaction can be reconstructed by the simulator, the interaction does
not contain anything that V∗ cannot already compute by itself (on just the in-
put x). Because the simulator is allowed to be an arbitrary PPT machine, this
traditional notion of ZK only guarantees that the class of PPT adversaries learn
nothing. To measure the knowledge gained by a particular verifier, Goldreich,
Micali and Wigderson [28] (see also [24]) put forward the notion of knowledge
tightness: intuitively, the “tightness” of a simulation is a function relating the
(worst-case) running-time of the verifier and the (expected) running-time of the
simulator. Thus, in a knowledge-tight ZK proof, the verifier is guaranteed not to
gain more knowledge than what it could have computed in time closely related
to its worst-case running-time.
Micali and Pass [49] recently introduced the notion of precise zero knowl-
edge (originally called local ZK in [49]). In contrast to traditional ZK (and also
knowledge-tight ZK), precise ZK considers the knowledge of an individual veri-
fier in an individual execution—it requires that the view of any adversarial verifier
V∗, in which V∗ takes t computational steps, can be reconstructed in time closely
related to t—say 2t steps. More generally, we say that a zero-knowledge proof
has precision p(·) if the simulator uses at most p(t) + poly(n) steps to output a
view in which V takes t steps on common input an instance x ∈ {0, 1}n.
This notion thus guarantees that the verifier does not learn more than what
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can be computed in time closely related to the actual time it spent in an interac-
tion with the prover. Such a guarantee is important, for instance, when consid-
ering knowledge of “semi-easy” properties of the instance x, considering proofs
for “semi-easy” languages L, or when considering deniability of interactive pro-
tocols (see [49, 52] for more discussion).
In a joint work with Pandey et. al. [51], we construct the first ZK protocol
that enjoys both precision and concurrent security. The crux of [51] is a slightly
modified KP simulator:
1. The KP simulator is modified to obliviously rewind based on time, i.e.,
the number of Turing machine steps taken by V∗, instead of the number of
messages sent by V∗.
2. The KP simulator is modified to output the view of V∗ on the “first” thread
that it simulates (i.e., outputs the view in the first sibling block instead of
the second).
In fact, the second modification could not be directly analyzed with the tech-
niques of [51] (based on the PRS analysis). Instead, [51] ask that sibling blocks
be simulated in parallel (instead of one after another); this requires subtle mod-
ifications to the PRS analysis, and the addition of a doubling trick to guess the
running time of V∗ so that the simulator knows how many recursive levels to
simulated in parallel.
In this section we show how precision can be achieved with the new analysis
presented in Section 2.2. Looking at the lazy KP simulator, it already outputs
the view of V∗ on the “first” simulation thread. Therefore, to make the lazy
KP simulator precise, we only need to modify it to rewind based on time. In
50
other words, simply let lazy-rewind(t, ·, ·) simulate V∗ for t Turing machine steps
instead of t messages. The observations in Section 2.2.3 then allow us to obtain
(and expand to arguments of knowledge) the main theorems of [51], namely:7
Theorem 12. For any integer functions k and g satisfying k(n)/g(n) ∈ ω(log n), there
exists a O(k(n))-round concurrent zero-knowledge argument of knowledge for all of
NP, based on one-way functions, with precision p(n, t) ∈ O(t2logg(n) t). In particular, for
any ε > 0, there exists a ω(log n)-round instantiation of the protocol with precision
p(n, t) ∈ O(t1+ε).
2.4 The PRS Analysis
In this section we give a brief overview of the PRS analysis, and compare it to
our extensions.
On counting arguments. The PRS approach of mapping bad random tapes to
good random tapes is different from the approach taken in this paper. In this
section, we provide a brief overview of the PRS analysis.
Given a bad random tape, the PRS analysis deals with minimal rewinding in-
tervals, defined to be minimal blocks that contain a slot, without containing start
or end.8 Since minimal rewinding intervals are not “composable” when they
overlap, the PRS analysis focuses on a (maximal) set of disjoint minimal rewind-
ing intervals. To make up for lost intervals due to overlapping, the PRS analysis
7In [49, 51], each verifier message was padded to ensure that the simulator has enough time
to generate its messages. We have defined precision to allow the simulator some fixed polyno-
mial overhead (independent of the running time of V∗) to overcome this technical (but simple)
obstacle. See [49, 51] for more details.
8Here we adopt some of our terminologies to explain the PRS analysis.
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B′′′
B′′
B′
B
C
s
cousins
Figure 2.6: A pictorial representation of the original KP rewind schedule, ex-
tended from Figure 5 of [61]. We show how a rewinding interval B
is related to its sibling (B′), its parent (C), and its cousins (B′, B′′, B′′′).
To swap block B with its cousin B′′, one needs to exchange the ran-
domness used on the two highlighted thread.
swaps each minimal rewinding interval not only with its sibling (as we do), but
also with its “cousins”. See Figure 2.6 for an illustration of cousins blocks. Note
that a block may have many cousins (but only one sibling). Moreover, swapping
a block with its cousins may require an exchange of random tape segments out-
side the two blocks, and therefore produce changes in the simulation outside of
the cousins
Next, the analysis needs to determine for each rewinding interval, how many
cousins swaps will result in a new distinct random tape; this step is complicated
because a large portion of the random tape maybe shuffled to perform a cousin
swap, destroying other potential rewinding intervals. Each rewinding interval
is thus assigned a weight corresponding to the number of available cousins. Fi-
nally, a somewhat elaborate analysis is used to lower-bound the sum of weights
over the chosen (maximal) subset of disjoint rewinding intervals. (Recall that, in
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contrast, our analysis is local—we are only required to show that a single swap
of a block with its sibling results in one new random tape.)
On the “hybrid simulator”. To enable the above counting argument, the PRS
analysis only bounds the failure probability of a “hybrid rewinding simulator”,
which uses the witness of the input statement to produce a simulated view of
V∗. More specifically, the hybrid simulator proceeds like the actual simulator
to extract “fake witnesses”—and fails whenever extraction does not work—but
uses the real witness to complete the Stage 2 proof. Next, the PRS analysis shows
that the hybrid simulator is indistinguishable from the real simulator. This relies
on the Stage 2 proof being committed-verifier, so that the adversarial verifier
cannot extract the witness used in the Stage 2 proof (and thus distinguish the
two simulators), even though there are many rewinds. In contrast, we do not
use a hybrid argument regarding two rewinding simulators (see Claim 9), and
so our analysis is not limited to committed-verifier protocols.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCURRENT ZERO KNOWLEDGE IN THE TIMING MODEL,
REVISITED
As a cost for concurrent security, known cZK protocols are usually less efficient
than their standalone ZK counterparts. This gap in efficiency, the concurrency
overhead can take many forms.
The original constant-round cZK protocol of [20] is constructed in the timing
model (also explored in [25]). Informally speaking, the timing model assumes
that every party has a local stopwatch, and that all these stopwatches more or
less agree on how long is 1 second. Also, all parties know a (pessimistic) upper-
bound, ∆, on the time it takes to deliver a message on the network. As argued by
Goldreich [25], this assumption seems most reasonable for systems today. The
problem, however, is that known cZK protocols in the timing model [20, 25] are
not very efficient in terms of execution time: despite having a constant number
of rounds (4 or 5 messages), the prover in these protocols delays the response of
certain messages by time ∆. In other words, every instance of the protocol must
take time longer than the pessimistic bound on the max latency of the network
(rather than being based on the actual message-delivery time).
Leaving the timing model, Richardson and Kilian [64] (and subsequent im-
provements by Kilian and Petrank [42] and Prabhakaran, Rosen and Sahai [61])
show how to construct cZK protocols in the standard model (without clocks).
Here the protocols are “message-delivery” driven, but there is a significant in-
crease in round-complexity. Whereas constant-round ZK protocols exists in the
standalone setting, O˜(log n)-rounds are both necessary and sufficient for black-
box cZK protocols [61, 43, 65, 14]. To circumvent this lower bound, many constant-
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round cZK protocols are constructed under setup assumptions, some more costly
than others, such as public-key registries or common reference strings (e.g.,
[21, 18, 13]). In another related work, Pass and Venkitasubramaniam [59] give
a constant-round black-box cZK protocol without setup assumptions, but at the
expense of having quasi-polynomial time simulators (against quasi-polynomial
time adversaries). Finally, known non-black-box ZK protocols are inherently
inefficient due to their use of Karp reductions. So far, we have seen the concur-
rency overhead in the form of extra round complexity, protocol running time,
simulator running time (concrete security), or costly setup assumptions.
Overview
In this chapter we revisit the timing model. Ideally, we want to construct cZK
protocols that are efficient in all three following areas: small (constant) round-
complexity, low imposed delays, and fast simulation (we already have a low
cost setup assumption). As communicated by Goldreich [25], Barak and Mic-
ciancio suggested the following possible improvement to cZK protocols in the
timing model: The prover may only need to impose a delay δ that is a linear
fraction of ∆ (say δ = ∆/d), at the expense of increasing the running time of
the ZK simulator exponentially (around nO(d)). In other words, there could be a
compromise between protocol efficiency and knowledge security [24, 49] (i.e.,
simulator running-time). However, as discussed in [25], this suggestion has not
been proven secure. We show that such a trade-off is not only possible, but can
be significantly improved.1
1It seems that traditional techniques can be used to demonstrate the Barak-Micciancio sug-
gestion when the adversary employs a static scheduling of messages. However, adaptive sched-
ules seem harder to deal with. See Section 3.2.1 for more details.
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Trading rounds for minimum delays. The original work of Richardson and
Kilian [64] shows that increasing the number of communication rounds can de-
crease the running-time of the simulator. Our first result shows that by only
slightly increasing the number of rounds, but still keeping it constant (e.g., 10
messages), the prover may reduce the imposed delay to δ = ∆/2d, while keeping
the simulator running time at nO(d). This is accomplished by combining simula-
tion techniques from both the timing model [20, 25] (polynomial time simulation
but high timing constraints) and the standard model [64, 59] (quasi-polynomial
time simulation but no timing constraints). As far as we know, this yields the
first formal proof that constant-round concurrent zero-knowledge protocols are
possible using a delay δ that is smaller than ∆.
“Eye-for-an-eye” delays. The traditional approach for constructing cZK proto-
cols is to “penalize” all parties equally, whether it is in the form of added round
complexity or imposed timing delays. One may instead consider the notion of
punishing only adversarial behavior, similar to the well-known “tit-for-tat” or
“eye-for-an-eye” technique of game theory (see e.g., [1]). The work of Cohen,
Kilian and Petrank [16] first implemented such a strategy (with respect to cZK)
using an iterated protocol where in each iteration, the verifier is given a time
constraint under which it must produce all of its messages; should a verifier
exceed this constraint, the protocol is restarted with doubled the allowed time
constraint (the punishment here is the resetting); their protocol had O˜(log2n)
rounds and O˜(log n) “responsive complexity”—namely, the protocol takes time
O˜(log n)T to complete if each verifier message is sent within time T . The work
of Persiano and Visconti [60] and Rosen and shelat [67] takes a different ap-
proach and punish adversaries that perform “bad” schedulings of messages by
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adaptively adding more rounds to the protocol; their approaches, however, only
work under the assumption that there is a single prover, or alternatively that
all messages on the network are exposed on a broadcast channel (so that the
provers can check if a problematic scheduling of messages has occurred).
In our work, we instead suggest the following simple approach: Should a
verifier provide its messages with delay t, the prover will delay its message
accordingly so that the protocol completes in time p(t) + δ, where p is some
penalty function and δ is some small minimal delay. We note that, at a high-level,
this approach is somewhat reminiscent of how message delivery is performed
in TCP/IP.
As we show, such penalty-based adaptive delays may significantly improve
the compromise between protocol efficiency and knowledge security. For ex-
ample, setting p(t) = 2t (i.e., against a verifier that responds in time t < ∆,
the prover responds in time t + δ) has a similar effect as increasing the num-
ber of rounds: The prover may reduce the minimal imposed delay to δ = ∆/2d,
while keeping the simulator running time at nO(d). Moreover, if we are willing
to use more aggressive penalty functions, such as p(t) = t2, the minimal delay
may be drastically reduced to δ = ∆1/2d , greatly benefiting “honest” parties that
respond quickly, while keeping the same simulator running time. Note that,
perhaps surprisingly, we show that such a “tit-for-tat” technique, which is usu-
ally employed in the setting of rational players, provides significant efficiency
improvements even with respect to fully adversarial players.
Combining it all. Finally, we combine our techniques by both slightly increas-
ing the round complexity and implementing penalty-based delays. We state our
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main theorem below for p(t) = t (no penalty), ct (linear penalty), and tc (polyno-
mial penalty) (in the main text we provide an expression for a generic p(t)):
Theorem 13. Let ∆ be an upper-bound on the time it takes to deliver a message on the
network. Let r and d be integer parameters, and p(t) be a (penalty) function. Then,
assuming the existence of claw-free permutations, there is a (2r + 6)-message black-box
perfect cZK argument for all of NP with the following properties:
• The simulator has running time (rn)O(d).
• For any verifier that cumulatively delays its message by time at most T , the prover
will provide its last message in time at most p(T ) + δ, where
δ =

2∆/rd if p(t) = t (no penalty)
2∆/(cr)d if p(t) = ct (linear penalty)
(2∆)1/c
d
r1+1/c+···+1/cd−1
≤ (2∆)1/cdr if p(t) = tc (polynomial penalty)
We make a few observations regarding Theorem 13.
On the number of rounds. Even without penalty-based delays, if r = 2, we
achieve an exponential improvement in the imposed delay (δ = ∆/2d), compared
to the Barak-Micciancio suggestion (as communicated by Goldreich [25]) which
suggested a delay of δ = ∆/d. Larger r (i.e., more rounds) allows us to further
improve the delay.
On adversarial networks. If an adversary controls the whole network, it may
also delay messages from the honest players. In this case, honest players (that
answer as fast as they can) are also penalized. However, the adversary can any-
way delay message delivery to honest players, so this problem is unavoidable.
What we guarantee is that, if a pair of honest players are communication over a
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channel that is not delayed (or only slightly delayed) by the adversary, then the
protocol will complete fast.
On networks with failure. Note that even if the network is not under adver-
sarial control, messages from honest parties might be delayed due to network
failures. We leave it as an open question to (experimentally or otherwise) deter-
mine the “right” amount of penalty to employ in real-life networks: Aggressive
delays allow us to minimize the imposed delay δ, but can raise the expected
protocol running time if network failures are common. Note that one solution
is for honest parties to restart their protocol sessions in the presence of network
spikes; such restarts would harm an adversary staging a coordinated attack,
and are relatively harmless towards honest parties (so long as network spikes
are rare).
On concurrent multi-party computation. [40] and [45] show that concurrent
multi-party computation (MPC) is possible in the timing model using delays
of length O(∆). Additionally, [45] shows that at least ∆/2 delays are necessary
to achieve concurrent MPC in the timing model. In retrospect, this separation
between concurrent ZK and MPC should not be surprising since cZK can be
constructed in the plain model [64, 42, 61], but concurrent MPC cannot [12, 47].
Organization
In Section 3.1 we give definitions regarding the timing model. An overview of
our protocol and zero-knowledge simulator, followed by their formal descrip-
tions, is given in Section 3.2. The analysis of our protocol and simulator is found
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in Section 3.3.
3.1 The Timing Model
In the timing model, originally introduced by Dwork, Naor and Sahai [20], we
consider a model that incorporates a “timed” network. Informally, in such a net-
work, a (known) maximum network latency ∆—the time it takes for a message
to be computed and delivered over the network—is assumed. Moreover, each
party (in our case the honest provers) possesses a local clock that is somewhat
synchronized with the others (in the sense that a second takes about the same
time on each clock).
As in [20, 25, 40], we model all the parties in the timing model as interactive
Turing machines that have an extra input tape, called the clock tape. In an ad-
versarial model, the adversary has full control of the content of everyone’s clock
tape (it can initialize and update the tape value at will), while each machine only
has read access to its own clock tape. More precisely, when a party Pi is invoked,
the adversary initializes the local clock of Pi to some time t of its choice. There-
after the adversary may, at any time, overwrite the all existing clock tapes with
new time values. To model that in reality most clocks are reasonably but not
perfectly synchronized, we consider adversaries that are ε-drift preserving, as
defined below:
Let σ1, σ2, . . . be a series of global states of all machines in play; these states
are recorded whenever the adversary initiates a new clock or updates the exist-
ing clocks. Denote by CLKP(σ) the value of the local clock tape of machine P at
state σ. We say that an adversary is ε-drift preserving if for every pair of parties
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P and P′ and every pair of states σ and σ′, it holds that
1
ε
(CLKP(σ) − CLKP(σ′)) ≤ CLKP′(σ) − CLKP′(σ′) ≤ ε(CLKP(σ) − CLKP(σ′))
As in [20, 25, 40], we use the following constructs that utilize the clock tapes.
Below, by local time we mean the value of the local clock tape.
Delays: When a party is instructed to delay sending a message m by δ time,
it records the present local time t, checks its local clock every time it is
updated, and sends the message when the local time reaches t + δ.
Time-out: When a party is instructed to time-out if a response from some other
party Pi does not arrive in δ time, it records the present time t. When the
message from Pi does arrive, it aborts if the local time is greater than t + δ.
Measure: When a party is instructed to measure the time elapsed between two
messages, it simply reads the local time t when the first message is sent/
received, and reads the local time t′ again when the second message is
sent/received. The party then outputs the elapsed time t′ − t.
Although the measure operator is not present in previous works, it is essen-
tially the quantitative version of the time-out operation, and can be implemented
without extending the timing model. For simplicity, we focus on the model
where the adversary is 1-drift preserving, i.e. all clocks are synchronized, but
our results easily extend to ε-drift preserving adversaries.
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3.1.1 Black-Box Concurrent Zero-Knowledge in the Timing Model
The standard notion of concurrent zero-knowledge extends straightforwardly
to the timing model; all machines involved are simply augmented with the
aforementioned clock tape. The view of a party in an interaction still consists of
all incoming messages as well as the its random tape, and additionally contains
its clock tape. In particular, the view of the adversary determines the value of
all the clocks.
Our definition of cZK in the timing model is slightly different from that of
[25]. The definition of [25] assumes that the adversary never triggers a time-out
from any prover. [25] also assumes that the adversary always delays the veri-
fier messages as much as permitted, but is assumption is no longer without loss
of generality for protocols with penalty-based delays. Therefore in our model,
the adversary is given total control over all the clocks (subject to ε-drift preserv-
ing), similar to the definition of [40] for the setting of concurrent multi-party
computation.
3.2 A cZK Protocol a Simulator in the Timing Model
Following the works of [23, 26], later extended to the concurrent setting by [64,
42, 61, 59], we consider ZK protocols with two stages:
Stage 1: First the verifier V “commits to a trapdoor” (the start message). This is
followed by one or multiple slots; each slot consists of a prover challenge
(the opening of the slot) followed by a verifier response (the closing of the
slot). A rewinding black-box ZK simulator can rewind any one of these
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slots to extract the verifier trapdoor.
Stage 2: The protocol ends with a modified proof of the original statement that
can be simulated given the verifier trapdoor.
To generate the view of an adversarial verifier V∗ in the standalone setting, a
black-box simulator simply rewinds a slot to learn the trapdoor, and use it to
simulate the final modified proof.
In the concurrent setting, however, V∗ may fully nest another session inside a
slot (i.e., after the prover sends the opening message, V∗ schedules a full session
before replying with the closing message). In order for the simulator to rewind
this slot, it would need to simulate the view of the nested session twice. There-
fore, repeated nesting may cause a naive simulator to have super-polynomial
running time [20]. Different techniques were employed in different models to
circumvent this difficulty caused by nesting. In the timing model, [20, 25] shows
that by delaying the Stage 2 proof and limiting the time allowed between the
opening and closing of any slot, we can avoid the nesting situation all together.
On the other hand, [64] showed that if the protocol has enough slots, the simu-
lator can always find a slot that isn’t “too nested” to rewind.
3.2.1 The Protocol Intuition
The work of [59] describes a simulator (based on the work of [64]) that works
also for constant-round protocols. Its running time (implicitly) depends on the
maximum nesting level/depth of the least nested slot. Specifically, the running
time of the simulator is nO(d) when this maximum depth of nesting is d. Building
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upon this, we now focus on reducing the maximum depth of nesting in the
timing model.
In the following overview of our techniques, we assume that V∗ interleaves
different sessions in a static schedule; the full generality of dynamic scheduling
is left for our formal analysis. Additionally, we keep track of the running time of
our protocol as a function of T—the total amount of accumulated delay caused
by the verifier in all the messages.
Imposing traditional timing delays with one slot. We first review the works
of [20, 25]. Recall that ∆ is the maximum network latency—the time it takes
for a message to be computed and delivered over the network. We require that
the time between the opening and closing of each slot be bounded by 2∆ (oth-
erwise the prover aborts); this is the smallest time-out value that we may ask of
the honest verifier. At the same time, the prover delays the Stage 2 proof by δ
time (after receiving the closing message of the last slot), where δ is a parameter
(Fig. 3.1a). It is easy to see that if δ = 2∆, then no nesting can occur (Fig. 3.1b).
In this case the running time of the protocol is T + ∆.
start
opening
closing
Stage 2
P V
a slot
times-out
in 2∆
delay δ
(a) 1 slot protocol with traditional timing con-
straints
session 1
times-out
in 2∆
session 2
2∆
(b) δ = 2∆ prevents nesting.
Figure 3.1: Traditional timing delays with 1 slot.
If we consider the suggestion of Barak and Micciancio and set δ = 2∆/d, then
64
up to d levels of nesting can occur (Fig. 3.2). In this case, the running time of the
protocol is T + 2∆ and T + 2∆/d, respectively.
times-out
in 2∆
up to d levels
<
2(1− 1d )∆
2∆/d
2∆/d
•••
Figure 3.2: δ = 2∆/d gives at most d levels of nesting.
Increasing the number of slots. This idea was first explored by [64] in the
standard model where intuitively, more slots translates to more rewinding op-
portunities for the simulator. In the timing model, the effect of multiple slots is
much more direct. Let us look at the case of 2 slots. Suppose in some session,
V∗ delays the closing of a slot by the maximum allowed time, 2∆. Further sup-
pose that V∗ nests an entire session inside this slot. Then in this nested session,
one of the slots must have taken time less than ∆ (Figure 3.3a). Continuing this
argument, some fully nested session at level d must take time less than 2∆/2d.
Therefore if we set δ = 2∆/2d, V∗ cannot fully nest every slot beyond depth d,
and the running time of the protocol becomes T + 2∆/2d.
Penalizing the adversarial verifier with adaptive delays. Here we implement
our “eye-for-an-eye” approach of penalizing adversarial verifiers that delay mes-
sages. Let p(t) be a penalty function that satisfies p(t) > t and is monotonically
increasing. During Stage 1 of the protocol, the prover measures t, the total time
elapsed from the opening of the first slot to the closing of the last slot. Based on
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this measurement, the prover delays Stage 2 by time p(t) − t or by the minimal
imposed delay δ, whichever is greater. As a result, Stage 2 only starts after p(t)
time has elapsed starting from the opening of the first slot. For example, sup-
pose p(t) = 2t and that the protocol has 1 slot. Then for V∗ to fully nest a session
inside a slot that took time 2∆, the slot of the nested session must have taken
time at most ∆, giving the same effect as having 2 slots (Fig. 3.3b). Furthermore,
if we implement more aggressive penalties, such as p(t) = t2,2 then the slot of the
nested session is reduced to time
√
2∆. Therefore if we set δ = (2∆)1/2d , V∗ can-
not fully nest every slot beyond depth d, and the running time of the protocol
becomes T 2 + (2∆)1/2d .
times-out
in 2∆
< ∆
?
•••
(a) 2 slots, no penalty. One of the nested
slot must have half the delay.
times-out
in 2∆
< ∆
adaptive
delay
•••
(b) 1 slot, 2t penalty. The nested slot
must have half the delay as well.
Figure 3.3: Our main techniques of restricting the nesting depth of V∗.
Combining the techniques. In general, we can consider concurrent ZK pro-
tocols that both contain multiple slots and impose penalty-based delays (e.g.,
Fig. 3.4). If we have r slots and impose p(t) penalty on delays, and define
2Formally we may use p(t) = t2 + 1 to ensure that p(t) > t.
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g(t) = p(rt), then δ can be decreased to
d times
{ p−1( · · · p−1
( p−1(2∆)
r
)
r
)
r
= (g−1)d(2∆)
=

2∆/rd if p(t) = t (no penalty)
2∆/(cr)d if p(t) = ct (linear penalty)
(2∆)1/c
d
r1+1/c+···+1/cd−1
≤ (2∆)1/cdr if p(t) = tc (polynomial penalty)
while keeping the simulator running time at (rn)O(d). The running time of the
protocol is then p(T ) + δ.
times-out
in 2∆ <
√
2∆/2
<
√
2∆
adaptive
delay
•••
Figure 3.4: 2 slots and t2 penalty. Slots of nesting sessions decrease in size very
quickly.
Handling dynamic scheduling. So far we have discussed our analysis (and
have drawn our diagrams) assuming that V∗ follows a static schedule when
interleaving multiple sessions. In general though, V∗ may change the schedul-
ing dynamically based on the content of the prover messages. As a result, the
schedule (and nesting) of messages may change drastically when a black-box
simulator rewinds V∗. This phenomenon introduces many technical difficulties
into the analysis, but fortunately the same difficulties were also present and re-
solved [59]. By adapting the analysis in [59], we give essentially the same results
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in the case of dynamic scheduling, with one modification: An additional slot is
needed whenever δ < 2∆ (this includes even the case illustrated in Fig. 3.2).
For example, a minimal of 2 slots is needed to implement penalty-based delays,
and a minimum of 3 slots is needed to reap the improvements that result from
multiple slots.
Handling ε-drifts in clock tapes. As in the work of [20, 25] we merely need to
scale the time-out values in our protocols when the local clocks are not perfectly
synchronized. Specifically, if the adversary is ε-drift preserving for some ε ≥ 1,
then our protocol will impose a minimal delay of εδ and an adaptive delay of
εp(t) (when applicable) between the closing of the last slot and Stage 2.
3.2.2 Description of the protocol
Our cZK argument in the timing model, protocol TIMINGCONCZKARG, is very
similar to our cZK argument in the plain model, protocol CONCZKARG (see
Figure 2.1).
Let L be a language in NP with witness relation RL. Given a one-way func-
tion f , a parameter r, a penalty function p(t) : N → N that is monotonically
increasing and satisfies p(t) > t, a maximum delay ∆ and a minimal delay δ,
TIMINGCONCZKARG for language L proceeds in the following two stages. On
common input a security parameter n and an instance x ∈ {0, 1}n:
Stage 1: The verifier picks two random strings s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}n and sends c1 =
f (s1), c2 = f (s2) to the prover. The verifier also sends α1, . . . , αr+1, the first
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messages of r + 1 invocations of a WI special-sound proof of the statement
“c1 and c2 are in the image set of f”. These proofs are then completed
sequentially in r + 1 iterations.
In the jth iteration, the prover first sends β j ← {0, 1}n2 , a random second
message for the jth proof (opening of the jth slot), then the verifier replies
with the third message γ j of the jth proof (closing of the jth slot). The
prover times-out the closing of each slot with time 2∆, and measures the
time that elapsed between the opening of the first slot and the closing of
the r + 1st slot as t.
Stage 2: The prover delays by time max{p(t)− t, δ} , and then provides a perfect-
WI proof of knowledge of the statement “either x ∈ L, or that (at least) one
of c1 and c2 are in the image set of f”.
Protocol TIMINGCONCZKARG is more formally described in Figure 3.5. Ob-
serve that in addition to the timing operations, there are two small differences
between protocol TIMINGCONCZKARG and CONCZKARG,
• The opening of each slot (the third message of the SS proof) has length n
in CONCZKARG, and length n2 in TIMINGCONCZKARG. As we will see,
the n2 length requirement enables us to achieve perfect zero-knowledge.
(Also note that this requirement can be achieved with suitable padding.)
• Protocol CONCZKARG contains k slots, while protocol TIMINGCONCZKARG
contains r + 1 slots. This change of “round complexity parameter” is more
convenient for the analysis TIMINGCONCZKARG.
• Protocol TIMINGCONCZKARG uses a perfectWI argument in Stage 2. This
allows the simulator to generate the view of an adversarial verifier ex-
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Protocol TIMINGCONCZKARG:
Common Input: an instance x of a language L with witness relation RL.
Auxiliary Input for Prover: a witness w, such that (x,w) ∈ RL(x).
Parameters: r (round complexity), p (penalty function), ∆ (max delay), δ (min
delay)
Stage 1:
V uniformly chooses s1, s2 ∈ {0, 1}n.
V→ P: c1 = f (s1), c2 = f (s2), and r + 1 first messages α1, . . . , αr+1 of 4-round
computational-WI and SS proofs on common input (c1, c2) with respect
to the witness relation:
R f (c1, c2) = {s : f (s) = c1 or f (s) = c2}
This is called the start message.
For j = 1 to r + 1 do
P→ V [opening of slot j]: Select a second message β j ← {0, 1}n2 for the
jth WI special-sound proof. P times-out if the next verifier message
is not received in time 2∆.
V→ P [closing of slot j]: Third message γ j for the jth WI special-sound
proof.
P measures the time elapsed between the opening of the first slot and the
closing of the r + 1st slot as t.
Stage 2:
P delays the next message by time max{p(t) − t, δ}.
P↔V: A perfect-WI argument of knowledge on input (x, c1, c2) with respect
to the witness relation:
R f∨L(c1, c2, x) =
{
(s,w) : s ∈ R f (c1, c2) or w ∈ RL(x)
}
Figure 3.5: A concurrent ZK argument for NP in the timing model.
actly (sometimes called perfect zero-knowledge), which in turn enables
our analysis.
The soundness and the completeness of the protocol follows directly from
the proof of Feige and Shamir [23]; in fact, the protocol is an instantiation of
theirs. Intuitively, to cheat in the protocol a prover must “know” an inverse to
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either c1 or c2, which requires inverting the one-way function f .
3.2.3 Simulator Overview
At a very high-level our simulator follows that of Feige and Shamir [23]. The
simulator will attempt to rewind one of the special-sound proofs (i.e., the slots),
because whenever the simulator obtains two accepting proof transcripts, the
special-soundness property allows the simulator to extract a “fake witness” ri
such that ci = f (ri). This witness can later be used in the second phase of the
protocol. At any point in the simulation, we call a session of the protocol solved
if such a witness has been extracted. On the other hand, if the simulation reaches
Stage 2 of a session without extracting any “fake witnesses”, we say the simula-
tion is stuck.
In more detail, our simulator is essentially identical to that of [59], which
in turn is based on the simulator of [64]. The general strategy of the simulator
is to find and rewind the “easiest” slot for each session; during a rewind, the
simulator recursively invokes itself on any nested sessions when necessary. The
main difference between our work and that of [64, 59] lies in determining which
slot to rewind. In [64, 59], a slot that contains a “small” amount of startmessages
(freshly started sessions) is chosen, whereas in our simulation, a slot that runs
in “little time” (between the opening and the closing) is rewound. As we will
see, part of the analysis from [59] applies directly to our simulator modulo some
changes in parameters; we only need to ensure that our definition of “little time”
allows the simulator to always rewind some slot (formally argued in Claim 14).
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3.2.4 Description of the simulator
Our simulator is defined recursively. Intuitively on recursive level 0, the simu-
lator’s goal is to generate a view of V∗, while on all other recursive levels, the
simulator’s goal is to rewind a particular slot (from a previous recursion level).
On recursive level `, the simulator starts by feeding random Stage 1 messages
to V∗. Whenever a slot s closes, S decides whether or not to rewind s depending
on the time elapsed between the opening and the closing of s. If the elapsed
time is “small” (where the definition of small depends on the level `), S begins
to rewind the slot. That is, S recursively invokes itself on level `+1 starting from
the opening of slot s with a new (random) message β, with the goal of reaching
the closing message of slot s. While in level ` + 1, S continues the simulation
until one of the following happens:
1. The closing message γ for slot s occurs: S extracts a “fake” witness using the
special-sound property and continues its simulation (on level `).
2. V∗ aborts or delays “too much” in the rewinding: S restarts its rewinding using
a new challenge β for s. We show in expectation, S only restarts O(1) times.
Intuitively, this follows since during the execution at level `, S would only
rewind the slot s if V∗ did not abort and only took “little time” ( “if it
happened once, it will happen again”).
3. S is “stuck” at Stage 2 of an unsolved session that started at level ` + 1: S halts
and outputs fail (we later show that this never happens).
4. S is “stuck” at Stage 2 of an unsolved session that started at level `: Again, S
restarts its rewinding. We show that this case can happen at most m − 1
times, where m is the total number of sessions.
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5. S is “stuck” at Stage 2 of an unsolved session that started at level `′ < `: S
returns the view to level `′ (intuitively, this is just case 4 for the recursion
at level `′).
In the unlikely event that S asks the same challenge β twice, S performs
a brute-force search for the witness. Furthermore, to simplify the analysis of
the running-time, the simulation is cut-off if it runs “too long” and S extracts
witnesses for each session using brute-force search.
The basic idea behind the simulation is similar to [59]: We wish to define
“little time” appropriately, so that some slot of every session is rewound and
that expected running time is bounded. For a technical reason (used later in
Claim 14), we actually want the simulator to rewind one of the first r (out of
r + 1) slots of each session.
Take for example p(t) = 2t and r = 2 (3 slots). Based on our intuition from
Sect. 3.2.1, a good approach would be to ensure that the simulation at recursive
level ` finishes within time 2∆/4`, and define “little time” on level ` to be 2∆/4`+1.
Then, we know that any session that is fully executed at recursive level ` must
have taken time less than 2∆/(4` ·2) in Stage 1 (due to penalty-based delays), and
therefore one of the first two slot must have taken time less than 2∆/4`+1, making
it eligible for rewind. To show that the expected running time is bounded, we
simply set δ appropriately (as a function of d, ∆ and r) as in Sect. 3.2.1, and this
would guarantee that the recursion depth of the simulator is bounded.
A formal description of our simulator can be found in Figure 3.6. We rely on
the following notation.
• Define the function g : N → N by g(n) = p(rn). Recall that gk(n) is the
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function computed by composing g together k times, i.e., gk(n) = g(gk−1(n))
and g0(n) = n. Let d (the maximum depth of recursion) be mind{gd(δ) > 2∆}.
Note that if we choose δ = (g−1)k(2∆) for some k, then d = k.
• slot(i, j) will denote slot j of session i.
• W is a repository that stores the witness for each session. The update
W command extracts a witness from two transcripts of a slot (using the
special-sound property). If the two transcripts are identical (i.e. the open-
ings of the slot are the same), the simulator performs a brute-force search
to extract a “fake” witness si s.t. ci = f (si) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
• R is a repository that stores the transcripts of slots of unsolved sessions.
Transcripts are stored in R when the simulator gets stuck in a rewinding
(cases 4 and 5 mentioned in the high-level description).
3.3 Analysis of the Simulator
To prove correctness of the simulator, we show that the output of the simulator
is correctly distributed and its expected running-time is bounded. We first prove
in Claim 14 that the simulator never outputs fail. Using Claim 14, we show
that the output distribution of the simulator is correct in Claim 15, and that
the expected running time of the simulator is at most poly(mdrd) in Claim 18.
Theorem 13 then follows from Claim 15 and 18, together with the fact that if
δ = (g−1)k(2∆) then d = k.
Claim 14 is given below, while Claim 15 and 18 are given in the next two
sections; in any case, the proofs of Claim 15 and 18 are essentially identical
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SOLVEV
∗
d (x, `, hinitial, s,W,R):
Let h ← hinitial. Note that hinitial contains all sessions that are started on previous
recursion levels.
Repeat forever:
1. If v is a Stage 2 verifier message of some session, continue.
2. If V∗ aborts in the sessions of slot s, or the time elapsed since hinitial exceeds
gd+1−`(δ), restart SOLVE from hinitial.
3. If the next scheduled message is a Stage 2 prover message for session i and
W(i) , ⊥, then use W(i) to complete the WI proof of knowledge; if W(i) = ⊥
and start message of session i is in hinitial return h, otherwise halt with output
fail.
4. If the next scheduled message is a Stage 1 prover message for slot s′, pick a
random message β← {0, 1}n2 . Append β to h. Let v← V∗(h).
5. Otherwise, if v is the closing message for s′ = slot(i′, j′), then update W with
v (using R) and proceed as follows.
(a) If s = s′, then return h.
(b) Otherwise, if session i′ starts in hinitial, then return h.
(c) Otherwise, if W(i′) , ⊥ or the time elapsed since the opening of
slot(i′, j′) exceeds gd−`, then continue.
(d) Otherwise, let h′ be the prefix of the history h where the prover message
for s′ is generated. Set R′ ← φ. Repeat the following m times:
i. h∗ ← SOLVEV∗d (x, ` + 1, h′, s′,W,R′)
ii. If h∗ contains an accepting proof transcript for slot s′, extract wit-
ness for session i′ from h and h∗ and update W.
iii. Otherwise, if the last message in h∗ is the closing message for the
last slot of an session that started in hinitial return h∗.
iv. Otherwise, add h∗ to R′.
S V
∗(x,z)(x):
Let d ← mind{gd(δ) > 2∆}. Run SOLVEV∗d (x, 0, , , , ) and output whatever SOLVE out-
puts with one exception. If an execution of SOLVEV
∗
d (x, 0, , , , ) queries V
∗ more that 2n
times, proceed as follows:
Let h denote the view reached in the “main-line” simulation (i.e., in the top-level of
the recursion). Continue the simulation in a “straight-line” fashion from h by using a
brute-force search to find a “fake” witness each time Stage 2 of an session i is reached.
Figure 3.6: Description of our black-box ZK simulator.
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to [59], modulo a change of parameters. Throughout the analysis we assume
without loss of generality that the adversary verifier V∗ is deterministic (as it
can always get its random coins as part of the auxiliary input).
Claim 14. For every x ∈ L, S V∗(x,z)(x) never outputs fail.
Proof. Recall that S V∗(x,z)(x) outputs fail only if SOLVEV
∗
d (x, 0, , , ) outputs fail. Fur-
thermore, SOLVE outputs fail at recursive level ` only if it reaches Stage 2 of an
unsolved session that started at level ` (see Step 3 of SOLVE). We complete the
proof in two parts. First we show SOLVEV
∗
d will rewind at least one of the first
r slots of every session at level `. Then, we show that SOLVE always extracts a
witness when it rewinds a slot.
In order for SOLVE to be stuck at a session i that starts at recursive level `,
session i must reach Stage 2 within g(d−`)(δ) time-steps (otherwise SOLVE would
have rewound as per Step 2). This implies that t, the time between the opening of
the first slot and the closing of the last slot of session i, must satisfy p(t) ≤ g(d−`)(δ)
(due to penalty-based delays). This in turn implies that one of the first r slots of
session i must have taking time at most
t
r
≤ p
−1(g(d−`)(δ))
r
≤ g(d−`−1)(δ)
(here we use the monotonicity of p). By construction, SOLVE would have re-
wound this slot (i.e., execute Step 5.(d)).
Next we show that whenever SOLVE rewinds a slot, a witness for that ses-
sion is extracted. Assume for contradiction that SOLVE fails to extract a witness
after rewinding a particular slot. Let level ` and slot j of session i be the first
time this happens. This means at the end of Step 5.(d), m views are obtained,
yet none of them contained a second transcript for slot j. Observe that in such
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a view, SOLVE most have encountered Stage 2 of some unsolved session i′ (i.e.,
stuck). Yet, we can show that the m − 1 other sessions can each cause SOLVE to
be stuck at most once; this contradicts the fact that SOLVE is stuck on all m good
views.
For every session i′ that SOLVE gets stuck on, both the opening and the clos-
ing of the last slot occurs inside the rewinding of slot(i, j); otherwise, SOLVE
would have rewound one of the r slots that occurred before the opening of
slot(i, j) successfully and extracted a witness for session i′ (l, i, j was the first
“failed” slot). Furthermore, the transcript of this slot enables SOLVE to never
get stuck on session i′ again, since the next time that the last slot of session i′
closes will allow SOLVE to extract a witness for session i′. 
3.3.1 Indistinguishability of the Simulation
Claim 15. The following ensembles are identical:
{ViewV∗(P(x,w),V∗(x, z)}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗ =
{
S V
∗(x,z)(x)
}
x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
Proof. Consider the following hybrid simulator S˜ that receives the real witness
w to the statement x. S˜ on input x and w proceeds just like S in order to generate
the prover messages in Stage 1, but proceeds as the honest prover using the
witness w in order to generate messages in Stage 2 (instead of using the “fake”
witness as S would have). Using the same proof as in Claim 14, we can show
that S˜ never outputs fail. Furthermore, as the prover messages in Stage 1 are
chosen uniformly and S˜ behaves like an honest prover in Stage 2. Therefore, we
get:
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Claim 16. The following ensembles are identical:
{ViewV∗(P(x,w),V∗(x, z))}x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗ =
{
S˜ V
∗(x,z)(x,w)
}
x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
It remains to show that the output distributions of S˜ and S are identical. This
follows from the perfect-WI property of Stage 2 of the protocols, since the only
difference between the simulators S˜ and S is the choice of witness used. For
completeness, we provide a proof below.
Claim 17. The following ensembles are identical:
{
S V
∗(x,z)(x,w)
}
x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗ =
{
S˜ V
∗(x,z)(x,w)
}
x∈L,w∈RL(x),z∈{0,1}∗
Proof. To prove the claim we will rely on the fact that the running time of the
simulator is bounded. This holds since S stops executing SOLVE whenever it
performs more than 2n queries, and instead continues the simulation a straight-
line fashion, extracting “fake” witnesses using brute-force search. Assume for
contradiction that the claim is false, i.e., there exists a deterministic verifier V∗
such that the ensembles are not identical.
We consider several hybrid simulators, S i for i = 0 to N, where N is an upper-
bound on the running time of the simulator. S i receives the real witness w to the
statement x and behaves exactly like S , with the exception that Stage 2 messages
in the first i sessions are generated using the honest prover strategy (and the
witness w). By construction, S 0 = S˜ and S N = S . By assumption the outputs
of S 1 and S N are not identically distributed, therefore there must exist some j
such that the output of S j and S j+1 are different. But S j and S j+1 differs only
in the witness used to provide the Stage 2 argument of the j + 1st session; this
contradicts the perfect-WI property of the Stage 2 argument. 
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3.3.2 Running Time of the Simulator
Claim 18. For all x ∈ L, z ∈ {0, 1} ∗, and all m-session concurrent adversarial verifier
V∗, the expected running time of S V∗(x,z)(x) is bounded by poly(mdrd).
Proof. Recall that S starts by running SOLVE, but breaks in the event that SOLVE
makes more than 2n queries to V∗; in this case, S uses brute-force search to com-
pute a witness w ∈ RL(x), and continues in a straight-line simulation following
the honest prover strategy. By linearity of expectation, the expected running
time of S is
poly(E[# queries made to V∗ by SOLVE ])
+ E[time spent in straight-line simulation]
In Claim 19 below, we show that expected time spent in straight-line simulation
is negligible. In Claim 20 below, we show that the expected number of queries
made by SOLVE to V∗ is at most m2(d+1−`)(2r)d+1−`. This two claims together im-
plies Claim 18. 
Claim 19. The expected time spent by S in straight-line simulation is negligible.
Proof. The straight-line simulation takes at most poly(2n) steps since it takes
O(2n) steps to extract a “fake” witness. Recall that, SOLVE runs the brute-force
search only if it picks the same challenge (β) twice. Since, SOLVE is cut-off after
2n steps, it can pick at most 2n challenges. Therefore, by the union bound, the
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probability that it obtains the same challenge twice is at most 2
n
2n2
. Thus, the ex-
pected time spent by S in straight-line simulation is at most 2
n
2n2
poly(2n), which
is negligible. 
Claim 20. For all x ∈ L, h, s,W,R, ` ≤ d such that SOLVEV∗d (x, `, h, s,W,R) never
outputs fails, E[# queries by SOLVEV
∗
d (x, `, h, s,W,R)] ≤ m2(d+1−`)(2r)d+1−`.
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on `. To simplify notation let α(`) =
m2(d+1−`)(2r)d+1−`. When ` = d + 1, by design SOLVE does not perform any re-
cursive calls or rewinds and therefore the number of queries made by SOLVE is
bounded by the total number of prover messages (in a straight-line execution):
poly(mr) (m sessions of protocols with poly(r) rounds).
Assume the claim is true for ` = `′ + 1. We show that it holds also for ` = `′.
Consider some fixed x ∈ L, h, s,W,R such that SOLVEV∗d (x, `′, h, s,W,R) never
outputs fails. We show that
E[# queries by SOLVEV
∗
d (x, `
′, h, s,W,R)] ≤ m2(d+1−`′)rd+1−`′
= α(`′) = m2(2r)α(`′ + 1)
Towards this goal we introduce some additional notation. Given a view hˆ ex-
tending the view h,
• Let q`′sˆ (hˆ) denote the probability that the view hˆ occurs in the “main-line”
execution of SOLVEV
∗
d (x, `
′, h, s,W,R) (i.e., starting on level `) and that slot
sˆ opens immediately after hˆ.
• Let Γsˆ denote the set of views such that q`′sˆ (hˆ) > 0.
We bound the number of queries made by SOLVEV
∗
d (x, `
′, h, s,W,R) as the
sum of the queries SOLVE makes on level `′, and the queries made by recursive
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calls. The number of queries made by SOLVE on level `′ is upper-bounded
by the total number of messages prover messages in a straight-line execution,
i.e., poly(mr). The number of queries made on recursive calls is computed by
summing the queries made by recursive calls on over every slot sˆ and taking
expectation over every view hˆ (such that q`′sˆ (hˆ) > 0).
More precisely,
E[# queries by SOLVEV
∗
d (x, `
′, h, s,W,R)] ≤ mr +
∑
sˆ
∑
hˆ∈Γsˆ
q`
′
sˆ (hˆ)E sˆ(hˆ)
where E sˆ(hˆ) denotes the expected number of queries made by SOLVE from the
view hˆ on sˆ. There are two steps involved in computing E sˆ(hˆ). The first step
involves finding the expected number of times SOLVE is run on a slot, and the
second step using the induction hypothesis computing a bound for E sˆ(hˆ).
Step 1: Given a view hˆ from where slot sˆ opens, let p` denote the probability
that SOLVE rewinds slot sˆ from hˆ, i.e., p` is the probability that in the simulation
from hˆ at level `, V∗ completes slot sˆ within time gd−`(1) from the opening of slot
sˆ. Let y` denote the probability that when executing SOLVE at level ` from hˆ, V∗
either aborts in the session of slot sˆ or takes more than time gd−`(δ) to respond
to slot sˆ. We clearly have that p` ≤ 1 − y` (note that equality does not necessarily
hold since SOLVE might also return to a lower recursive level). Furthermore, it
holds that y` = y`+1. This follows since SOLVE generates random Stage 1 mes-
sages, and uses the same (real) witness to generate Stage 2 messages, indepen-
dent of the level of the recursion; additionally by Claim 14, SOLVE never halts
outputting fail, we conclude that the view of V∗ in the “main-line” simulation
by SOLVE on level l is identically distributed to its view on level l + 1.
Therefore, the expected number of times SOLVE recursively executes sˆ at
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level ` + 1, before obtaining a good view, is at most 11−y`+1 =
1
1−y` ≤ 1p` . Using
linearity of expectation, the expected number of times SOLVE executes sˆ before
obtaining m good views is at most mp` . Since, SOLVE rewinds sˆ from hˆ only with
probability p`, the expected number of recursive calls to level ` + 1 from hˆ is at
most p` mp` = m.
Step 2: From the induction hypothesis, we know that the expected number of
queries made by SOLVE at level `′ + 1 is at most α(`′ + 1). Therefore, if SOLVE
is run u times on a slot, the expected total number of queries made by SOLVE is
bounded by uα(`′ + 1). We conclude that
E sˆ(hˆ) ≤
∑
u∈N
Pr[u recursive calls are made by SOLVE from hˆ]uα(`′ + 1)
= α(`′ + 1)
∑
u∈N
u · Pr[u recursive calls are made by SOLVE from hˆ]
≤ mα(`′ + 1)
Therefore, E[# queries by SOLVEV
∗
d (x, `
′, h, s,W,R)] ≤
mr +
∑
sˆ
∑
hˆ∈Γsˆ
q`
′
sˆ (hˆ)E sˆ(hˆ) ≤ mr +
∑
sˆ
mα(`′ + 1)
∑
hˆ∈Γsˆ
q`
′
sˆ (hˆ)
≤ mr +
∑
sˆ
mα(`′ + 1) ≤ mr + (mr)mα(`′ + 1) ≤ α(`′)
This completes the induction step and concludes the proof of Claim 20. 
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CHAPTER 4
ON THE COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC-COIN ZERO KNOWLEDGE
PROTOCOLS
In this chapter we investigate a curious phenomenon regarding ZK and its
composition. Three basic notions of compositions are sequential composition
[31, 29], parallel composition [23, 27] and concurrent composition [23, 20]. In a
sequential composition, the players sequentially run many instances of a zero-
knowledge protocol, one after the other. In a parallel composition, the instances
instead proceed in parallel, at the same pace. Finally, in a concurrent composi-
tion, messages from different instances of the protocol may be arbitrarily inter-
leaved.
While the definition of ZK is closed under sequential composition [29], this
no longer holds for parallel composition [27] (and thus not for concurrent com-
position either). As we have seen though, there are O˜(log n)-round black-box
zero-knowledge protocols for all of NP that are secure under concurrent com-
position [64, 42, 61]. Moreover, if we are require security to hold only under
parallel composition, constant-round ZK protocols are known [25, 23, 26].
Whereas the original ZK protocols of [31, 28, 10] are public-coin—i.e., the ver-
ifier’s messages are its random coin-tosses—all of the aforementioned parallel
or concurrent ZK protocols use private coins. Indeed, in their seminal paper, Gol-
dreich and Krawczyk [27] show that only languages in BPP have constant-round
public-coin (stand-alone) black-box ZK protocols with negligible soundness er-
ror, let alone the question of parallel composition. In particular, their results im-
ply that (unless NP ⊆ BPP) the constant-round ZK protocols of e.g., [28, 10] with
constant soundness error cannot be black-box ZK under parallel repetition (as
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this would yield a constant-round black-box ZK protocol with negligible sound-
ness error).
A natural question is whether the constant-round restriction imposed by the
[27] result is necessary. Namely,
Is there a (possibly super-constant round) public-coin black-box ZK protocol
that is secure under parallel (or even concurrent) composition?
4.1 Overview
In this chapter we provide a negative answer to the above question. Namely, we
show that only languages in BPP have public-coin black-box ZK protocols that
remain secure under parallel (and thus also concurrent) composition, regardless
of round complexity.
Theorem 21. If L has a public-coin argument that is black-box zero-knowledge and
secure under parallel composition, then L ∈ BPP.
In fact, our result establishes that any public-coin, black-box ZK protocol for a
non-trivial language that remains secure under m parallel executions must have
Ω˜(m1/2) rounds.
Perhaps our requirements are too stringent? Barak [3] is able to construct
constant-round public-coin ZK arguments using non-black-box techniques, and
achieve bounded parallel security. Indeed, we show that either one of two re-
laxations is sufficient to construct public-coin ZK protocols secure under (some
form of) parallel composition; that is, we can construct non-black-box ZK ar-
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guments secure against full parallel composition, or black-box ZK proofs secure
against bounded parallel composition:1
Theorem 22. Assume the existence of one-way functions. Then for every polynomial
m, there exists an O(m3)-round public-coin black-box zero-knowledge proof for NP that
is secure under m-bounded concurrent composition.
Theorem 23. Assume the existence of collision-resistant hash-functions. Then there
exists a constant-round public-coin parallel zero-knowledge argument for NP.
Together, these results paint a full picture on the existence of public-coin ZK
protocols secure against parallel repetitions, given the choice of black-box sim-
ulation vs. non-black-box simulation, and full concurrency vs. bounded concur-
rency.
Finally, we briefly turn to compositions in models with trusted set-up. Canetti,
Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [13] show that in the Bare Public-Key (BPK)
Model, where each player has a registered public-key, constant-round black-box
concurrent ZK protocols exist for all of NP (whereas in the plain model without
set-up, Ω˜(log n) rounds are necessary for non-trivial languages [14]). We show
that for the case of public-coin protocols, the BPK setup does not help with com-
position.
Theorem 24. If L has a public-coin argument in the BPK model that is black-box zero-
knowledge and secure under parallel composition, then L ∈ BPP.
We remark that our lower bound does not extend to more elaborate public-
key setups. For example, Damgrd [18] shows that a public key infrastructure
1In fact, both Barak’s construction and our black-box construction achieves bounded concur-
rent security.
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with a certification authority can be used to construct constant-round public-
coin arguments that are black-box concurrent zero-knowledge.
As we will see, some of the intermediate ideas in our work are closely related
to the notion of resettable soundness [5]. Very informally, we establish that parallel
repetition of public-coin protocols not only reduces the soundness error [58,
36], but also qualitatively strengthens the soundness—roughly speaking, the new
protocols will be secure under a “resetting” attack.
4.1.1 Techniques for Theorem 21
To describe our techniques, first recall the Goldreich-Krawczyk [27] lower bound
that only languages in BPP have O(1)-round public-coin black-box ZK proto-
cols. Let Π = (P,V) be a public-coin black-box ZK protocol for a language L, and
consider an adversarial verifier V∗ that, instead of picking its messages at ran-
dom, computes them by applying a hash function to the current transcript. [27]
shows that any black-box simulator S , together with V∗, can decide L: on input
x, simply run S V∗(x) and accept if S outputs an accepting view of V∗. Using the
zero-knowledge property of Π, if x ∈ L, then S V∗(x) will output an accepting
view of V∗ (because an honest prover would convince V∗). The crux of their
proof is then to show that if x < L, then S V∗(x) will not output an accepting view.
If S does not rewind V∗, this would directly follow from the soundness of Π.
However, S may rewind V∗, and may only convince V∗ in one of its rewinding
“threads”. Nonetheless, [27] manages to show that if S , by rewinding or “re-
setting” V∗, manages to trick V∗ into accepting x < L, then we can construct a
machine T (based on S ) that manages to convince an external verifier V (with-
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out rewinding V), contradicting the soundness of the protocol. In other words,
they show that any O(1)-round public-coin protocol is sound under a resetting-
attack [13, 5], where the statement is fixed and the prover (simulator) running
time is bounded by a fixed polynomial. Analogously, to prove our results, we
show that any public-coin interactive protocol, repeated sufficiently many times
in parallel, (and again letting the verifier pick its messages by applying a hash
function to the transcript), is sound under a resetting-attack.
Previous reductions. The work of [27], as well as all subsequent black-box
lower bounds (e.g., [43, 65, 14, 6, 41, 34]) relies on the following approach for
constructing the stand-alone (non-resetting) prover T , given the rewinding sim-
ulator S . T incorporates S and internally emulates an execution of S with an in-
ternally emulated verifier (which of course can be rewound). During the emula-
tion, T appropriately picks some messages sent by S to the internal verifier, and
forwards them to an external verifier (and also forwards back the responses).
The crux of the various lower bounds lies in choosing the externally forwarded
messages so that the external verifier is convinced. The difficulty of this task
stems from the fact that, at the time of deciding whether to externally forward
a message or not, T does not yet know if S will eventually choose this message
to “continue” its simulation (and use it as part of the output view), or treat this
message simply as a “rewinding” (used to collect information).
For the case of constant-round protocols, [27] shows that externally forward-
ing a random selection of messages works; if the protocol has d rounds, this ran-
dom selection is “correct” with probability at least 1/qd, where q is the number
of queries made by the simulator to the verifier. This approach of simply run-
ning the simulator S “straight-line” seems hard to extend to protocols with a
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polynomial number of rounds; the number of possible choices for messages to
forward to the external verifier becomes too large.2
Our reduction. In our work, we are given a zero-knowledge protocol Π =
(P,V) for a language L that is secure under parallel repetitions. Building on the
same framework as [27], we let Vm∗ be a verifier that starts m parallel sessions
and generates its messages using hash-functions, let S be the black-box zero-
knowledge simulator, and use S Vm∗ to decide L. As we will see, we choose the
number of parallel sessions, m, as a (polynomial) function of the number of
rounds in Π. Following the same argument, it is enough to show that on input
x < L, S cannot produce an accepting view of Vm∗. Because we may view S as
a rewinding/resetting prover, it is equivalent to show that protocol (Pm,Vm∗) is
sound under resetting attacks. In the rest of this section we omit the common
input x.
The crux of our work is then the following reduction: Given S , a resetting
cheating prover of the parallelized protocol that convinces Vm∗, we show how to
construct T , a straight-line (non-rewinding) cheating prover of the original single
session protocol that convinces V ; this contradicts the soundness of protocol Π.
To further clarify the difference between S and T , let us compare the transcripts
of an interaction between T and V , and of an interaction between S and Vm∗. A
transcript of the interaction between T and V is simply a transcript of a single
session of the protocol Π; each query from T to V is simply a prefix of the tran-
2For the case of sub-logarithmic-round protocols, Canetti, Kilian, Petrank and Rosen [14]
show that when given the freedom to construct a concurrent adversarial verifier that can sched-
ule messages in an arbitrary way, there exists some particular scheduling which makes it easy
to identify appropriate messages to forward externally. Their work has the advantage that it
applies to private-coin zero-knowledge protocols, but is not applicable in our setting due to
the use of concurrent adversarial verifiers, and being limited to sub-logarithmic-round protocols.
Incidentally, they also run the simulator S in a straight-line manner.
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script that extends the previous query by one round of the protocol. A transcript
of the interaction between S and Vm∗ can be much longer due to rewinds; fur-
thermore, each query from S to Vm∗ is a prefix of a transcript of the parallelized
protocol.
On a high level, T internally runs S with an internally simulated Vm∗, and
externally interacts with an external verifier V . In order to take advantage of S
to convince the external verifier V , T “embeds” the interaction with V into the
interaction between S and Vm∗. This “embedding” is not straightforward for
the following two reasons. Firstly, just as in [27], the external verifier V cannot
be reset, whereas S may reset Vm∗ many times (i.e., S can make many more
queries than the number of rounds of the protocol); as we will explain shortly, T
carefully picks a subset of the rewindings to forward externally. Secondly, recall
that V is a single session verifier, whereas Vm∗ is a m-session parallel verifier
(looking forward, the reason we let V be a single session verifier is to enable T
to appropriately pick which rewindings to forward). Therefore, T embeds the
interaction with V only into a single session i of the m parallel sessions in the
interaction between S and Vm∗; in fact, session i is picked uniformly random
at the beginning and fixed throughout the execution of the reduction (looking
forward again, the fact that session i is picked uniformly will be important for
our analysis).
To summarize, T only externally forwards a subset of the S queries, and
only forwards component i (corresponding to session i) of those queries. T then
forwards back external responses from V as component i of the same subset of
Vm∗ responses; all other Vm∗ responses are picked uniformly at random by T
internally (this includes all except component i in the responses to the selected
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subset of S queries, and all components of the remaining responses). Here we
rely on the fact that Π is public-coin in order for T to generate Vm∗ responses
in the forwarded session, despite the fact that other verifier responses in the
forwarded session may be externally generated by V .
Recall that the difficulty of the reduction comes from choosing which S
queries to forward externally. As remarked earlier, the approach of running
S in a straight-line manner seems unlikely to work for polynomial-round pro-
tocols. Instead, we let T rewind S (while S itself believes it is rewinding the
internally simulated Vm∗). Our strategy is twofold. Firstly, T only externally for-
wards (component i of) queries that have a good chance of being included by
S in its output (by assumption, S outputs a sequence of queries that convinces
Vm∗); because the protocol is public-coin, we can estimate this chance by doing
internal test-runs. Secondly, once we have forwarded (component i of) a query,
we “force” S to include the query in its output by repeatedly rewinding S while
re-picking the internally generated Vm∗ messages (thus skewing the distribution
of the internally generated Vm∗ messages).
To analyze T , we need to show that S would successfully convince the in-
ternally simulated Vm∗, even though T has embedded the external interaction
with V into the interaction between S and Vm∗. Note that the success probability
of S depends only on two inputs: the internally simulated Vm∗ messages, and
the embedded external V messages (these can be found only in the forwarded
session i). These two types of messages differ in that the internally simulated
Vm∗ messages are picked by T , through the help of test-runs, to be “good”, while
the external V messages are just uniform samples. We first show that if T is also
allowed to rewind the external verifier V (which we cannot), ensuring that inter-
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nal Vm∗ messages and external V responses are both “good”, then T only needs
to perform polynomially many rewinds in order for S to successfully convince
Vm∗. Next, to remove the assumption of rewinding V , we use a probabilistic
lemma due to Raz [63], originally used to prove that parallel repetition reduces
the soundness error in two-prover games. We show that if there are enough par-
allel sessions, then not being able to pick “good” verifier responses in just one
random session only introduces a small statistical error; since session i is picked
uniformly at random at the beginning, this suffices for bounding the success
probability of T .
ZK lower bounds and soundness amplification. As an independent contribu-
tion, we believe that our techniques elucidate an intriguing (and useful) con-
nection between lower bounds for black-box ZK, and feasibility results for sound-
ness/hardness amplification. Our techniques share many similarities with works
on soundness amplification under parallel repetitions, such as [9, 58, 38], and es-
pecially [36]; in particular, our use of Raz’s lemma is similar to its use in [36].
Whereas those works show how to transform a parallel prover with “small” suc-
cess probability into a stand-alone prover with “high” success probability, we
have adapted their techniques to transform a rewinding/resetting parallel prover
into a non-rewinding stand-alone prover.
As a further example of this connection, we extend our lower bound to the
BPK model by relying again on techniques developed for soundness amplifica-
tion. In the BPK model, we have the additional problem that the external verifier
can decide whether to accept or reject based on its secret key, which T does not
know. Consequently, T cannot determine whether the external verifier would
accept or reject when doing test-runs, which is crucial for deciding which mes-
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sages to forward externally. By relying on the “trust-halving” technique from
[39, 9], and its refinement in [36], we show how T can make “educated guesses”
on whether the external verifier accepts or not.
Extension to resettable soundness. More generally, the above techniques show
how to transform a public-coin protocol so that it is sound under a weak form
of resetting attack: where the statement is fixed, and the number of resets is a-
priori bounded. Simply take a public-coin protocol, sufficiently repeat it in par-
allel, and let the verifier generate its messages by applying hash-functions to the
current transcript. If the verifier uses pseudo-random functions instead of hash-
functions as in [5], then we may remove the a-priori bound on the number of
resets. Additionally, we show that if the original protocol is also a proof of knowl-
edge [31, 23, 4], then the parallelized version satisfies the original (strongest)
notion of resettable-soundness from [5], where the adversarial prover can also
change the statement between resets. [5] showed a similar type of result for
O(1)-round public-coin proofs of knowledge.
4.1.2 Techniques for Theorem 22
Our public-coin black-box ZK protocol is similar in spirit to the concurrent zero-
knowledge protocol of [64]. The proof has two stages. Stage one of the protocol
contains multiple slots; in slot i, the prover commits to a random bit pi using a
statistically binding commitment, and the verifier replies with its own random
bit vi (note that unlike [64], the verifier does not commit to the bits vi). Stage 2 is
a modified witness indistinguishable proof of either the original statement, or
that pi = vi for “many” slots.
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The intuition is that if the number of slots is sufficiently larger than the num-
ber of concurrent composition, then a simulator, with the aid of rewinds, can
always force (i.e., rewind until) pi = vi for “many” slots.
4.1.3 Techniques for Theorem 23
Let us briefly recall the idea behind Barak’s protocol (following a slight variant
of this protocol due to [53]). Roughly speaking, for language L and common
input x ∈ {0, 1}n, the prover P and verifier V proceed in two stages. In Stage 1,
P starts by sending a computationally-binding commitment c ∈ {0, 1}n to 0; V
follows by sending a “challenge” r ∈ {0, 1}2n. In Stage 2, P shows (using a wit-
ness indistinguishable argument of knowledge) that either there exists a “short”
string s ∈ {0, 1}n such that c is a commitment to a program Π such that Π(s) = r,
or x ∈ L. Soundness follows from the fact that even if a malicious prover P∗ tries
to commit to some program Π (instead of committing to 0), with high probabil-
ity, the string r sent by V will be different from Π(s) for every string s ∈ {0, 1}n.
To prove ZK, consider the non-black-box simulator that commits to the code of
the malicious verifier V∗; note that by definition it holds that Π(c) = V∗(c) = r,
and the simulator can use s = c as a “fake” witness in the final proof.
Now, let us consider parallel composition. That is, we need to simulate the
view of a verifier that starts m = poly(n) parallel executions of the protocol. The
above simulator no longer works in this setting: the problem is that the verifier’s
code is now a function of all the commitments ~c = c1, . . . , cm sent in the different
executions. (Note that if we increase the length of r, and therefore the allowed
length of s, we can handle a bounded number of execution, by simply letting
93
s = ~c). To get around this problem, we change the proof in the last stage as
follows. Instead of proving the existence of a string s such that Π(s) = r, we
show the existence of a seed s ∈ {0, 1}n for a pseudorandom function f , and an
index i ∈ {0, 1}log2 n, such that Πi(~c) = r, where ci is a commitment to Π using fs(i)
as randomness, and Πi(x) is the “projection” of Π onto the ith“coordinate”—i.e.,
the output of Π in the ithparallel execution. To construct the zero-knowledge
simulator, we start by picking a seed s, compute commitments ci to Π using
fs(i) as randomness, and use s and i as a “fake-witness” to simulate Stage 2 in
execution i.
Outline
We give some preliminaries in Section 4.2, and jump into our impossibility re-
sults in Section 4.3 (standard model) and Section 4.4 (bare-public-key model).
We then present our public-coin black-box bounded-concurrent zero-knowledge
protocol in Section 4.5, and our public-coin non-black-box parallel zero-knowledge
protocol in Section 4.6. Details of our application to resettable soundness can be
found in Section 4.7.
4.2 Preliminaries
To aid our impossibility result, we recall the definition of resettable soundness.
To aid our construction of non-black-box parallel zero-knowledge protocol, we
recall the definition of universal arguments.
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4.2.1 Resettable Soundness
Informally, given a protocol Π = (P,V), a cheating prover P∗ performing a re-
setting attack has the power to reset (i.e., rewind) the honest resettable verifier,
resulting in multiple sessions of Π. Furthermore, in all these sessions, V uses
the same random tape that is uniformly chosen before the attack. For example,
a black-box zero-knowledge simulator is a valid resetting attack. We can con-
sider two different models on how the input instances are chosen for each ses-
sion. In the model of resettable-soundness as defined by [5], P∗ can adaptively
choose different input instances for each session. We also consider the model
where P∗ is given an input instance that must be used in all sessions (similar
to the definition of resettable zero-knowledge by [13]); we call this fixed-input
resettable-soundness.
Definition 23 (Resetting-Attack [5, Definition 3.1]). A resetting attack of a cheat-
ing prover P∗ on a resettable verifier V is defined by the following two-step
random process, indexed by a security parameter n:
1. Uniformly select and fix t = poly(n) random-tapes, denoted r1, . . . , rt, for V ,
resulting in deterministic strategies Vr j . When an input x ∈ {0, 1}n is also
chosen, we call Vr j(x) an incarnation of V (i.e., V with its randomness set
to r j and common input set fixed to x).
2. On input 1n, P∗ is allowed to interact with poly(n) incarnations of V . P∗
chooses each incarnation (adaptively) by choosing x ∈ {0, 1}n and j ∈ [t]
(these choices may depend on P∗’s previous interactions with other in-
carnations of V). P∗ may freely switch among interactions with different
incarnations of V , and may rewind/reset each incarnation of V .
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We further define two variants of resetting attacks. In a fixed-input resetting
attack, the cheating prover P∗ is given a fixed input instance x to use in all ses-
sions. In a q-query resetting attack, the cheating prover P∗ is allowed q queries
total for verifier messages (summed over all interactions among the different
incarnations of V).
Remark. We have chosen the “interleaving” attack model instead of the “non-
interleaving” attack model, where P∗ must finish its current interaction with an
incarnation of V completely, before starting another interaction (see discussions
in [13, 5]). The two models are equivalent as shown in [13]. We choose the
“interleaving” model because later we will make the assumption that P∗ never
makes the same query twice to V . The notion of a q-query resetting attack is also
more natural in the “interleaving” model.
Definition 24 (Resettable-Soundness [5, Definition 3.1]). Let Π = (P,V) be a pair
of interactive machines where V is PPT. We say Π is a resettably-sound proof
for a language L (resp., resettably-sound argument) if the following condition
holds:
Resettable-Soundness: For every resetting attack by P∗ (resp., polynomial-
size P∗), the probability that some incarnation Vr(x) accepts and x < L is
negligible in n.
We say Π is a q-query fixed-input resettably-sound proof (resp., argument) for
a language L if the resettable-soundness property holds with respect to any q-
query fixed-input resetting attack.
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4.2.2 Universal Arguments
Universal arguments (introduced in [4] and closely related to CS-proofs [48]) are
used in order to provide “efficient” proofs to statements of the form y = (M, x, t),
where y is considered to be a true statement if M is a non-deterministic machine
that accepts x within t steps. The corresponding language and witness relation
are denoted LU and RU respectively, where the pair ((M, x, t),w) is in RU if M
(viewed here as a two-input deterministic machine) accepts the pair (x,w)within
t steps. Notice that every language in NP is linear time reducible to LU. Thus,
a proof system for LU allows us to handle all NP-statements. In fact, a proof
system for LU enables us to handle languages that are presumably “beyond”
NP, as the language LU is NE-complete (hence the name universal arguments).3
Definition 25 (Universal argument). A pair of interactive Turing machines (P,V)
is called a universal argument system if it satisfies the following properties:
• Efficient verification: There exists a polynomial p such that for any y =
(M, x, t), the total time spent by the (probabilistic) verifier strategy V , on
common input y, is at most p(|y|). In particular, all messages exchanged in
the protocol have length smaller than p(|y|).
• Completeness by a relatively efficient prover: For every ((M, x, t),w) in RU,
Pr[(P(w),V)(M, x, t) = 1] = 1
Furthermore, there exists a polynomial q such that the total time spent
by P(w), on common input (M, x, t), is at most q(TM(x,w)) ≤ q(t), where
TM(x,w) denotes the running time of M on input (x,w).
3Furthermore, every language in NEXP is polynomial-time (but not linear-time) reducible to
LU
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• Computational Soundness: For every polynomial size circuit family {P∗n}n∈N ,
and every triplet (M, x, t) ∈ {0, 1}n \ LU,
Pr[(P∗n,V)(M, x, t) = 1] < ν(n)
where ν(·) is a negligible function.
• Weak proof of knowledge: For every positive polynomial p there exists a
positive polynomial p′ and a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine
E such that the following holds: for every polynomial-size circuit family
{P∗n}n∈N , and every sufficiently long y = (M, x, t) ∈ {0, 1}∗ if Pr[(P∗n,V)(y) =
1] > 1/p(|y|) then
Pr[∃w = w1, . . .wt ∈ RU(y) s.t. ∀i ∈ [t], EP
∗
n
r (y, i) = wi] >
1
p′(|y|)
where RU(y)
def
= {w : (y,w) ∈ RU} and EP
∗
n
r (·, ·) denotes the function defined
by fixing the random-tape of E to equal r, and providing the resulting Er
with oracle access to P∗n.
4.3 Impossibility of Public-Coin Black-Box Parallel ZK
In this section we show that only languages in BPP have public-coin concur-
rent zero-knowledge protocols. We actually show a stronger result: Except for
languages in BPP, no public-coin protocol remains black-box zero-knowledge
when repeated in parallel. The formal theorems are stated below, where n de-
notes the security parameter or the input size.
Theorem 25. Suppose language L has a k = poly(n)-round public-coin black-box zero-
knowledge proof Π with soundness error 1/2. If m ≥ k log2 n and Πm is zero-knowledge,
then L ∈ BPP.
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Theorem 26. Suppose language L has a k = poly(n)-round public-coin black-box zero-
knowledge argument Π with soundness error 1/2. If m ≥ (k2 log k) log2 n and Πm is
zero-knowledge, then L ∈ BPP.
The difference between Theorem 25 and 26 is caused by the difference be-
tween proofs and arguments. While the two theorems differ slightly in parame-
ters, their proofs differ greatly. We remark that our theorems trivially hold with
respect to “non-aborting” verifiers since we focus only on public-coin protocols.
4.3.1 Reducing to Resettable Soundness
The proofs of Theorem 25 and 26 begin in the same high-level framework as that
of [27]. Suppose a language L has a k-round, public-coin ZK protocol Π = (P,V),
and Πm is zero-knowledge with a black-box simulator S that runs in time nd (as
with all previous zero-knowledge lower bounds, we start by assuming that the
simulator runs in strict polynomial time, and relax this assumption later in Sec-
tion 4.3.4). To show that L ∈ BPP, we construct a “random-looking” adversarial
verifier, V∗, and consider the following decision algorithm D: D(x) runs S V∗(x) to
generate a view of V∗, and accepts x if and only if V∗ accepts given the generated
view (which in turn occurs if and only if the honest verifier V accepts in all m
sessions of the view).
V∗ is actually a family of adversarial verifiers constructed as follows. Let
H be a family of hash functions that is random enough compared to the run-
ning time of S ; formally, H should be nd-wise independent (see [27, 15]). Given
h ← H, let V∗h be the verifier that when queried with transcript τ, responds
(deterministically) with the message h(τ). We write V∗ = V∗H to mean V
∗
h for a
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randomly chosen h, i.e., when D runs S V∗H, D first chooses h randomly from H
and then run S V∗h.
We make two easy observations about S V∗due to [27]. First, we may assume
that whenever S queries V∗ with a transcript or outputs a transcript τ, it first
queries V∗ with all the prefixes of τ; this only increases the running time of S
polynomially. Second, we may assume that S never queries V∗ with the same
transcript twice (instead S may keep a table of answers). Then the set of all
responses generated by V∗H is identical to the uniform distribution since H is
nd-independent and S makes at most nd queries to V∗.
We need to show that decision procedure D is both complete and sound.
Completeness states that if x ∈ L, then D should accept x with probability at
least 2/3. This easily follows: The output of S V∗(x) is indistinguishable from
an interaction of (Pm,V∗) since S is a zero-knowledge simulator. Furthermore,
(Pm,V∗) is identical to m copies of (P,V) since V∗ produces independent, truly
random verifier messages (made possible since V is public coin). Finally, by the
completeness property of Π, V will accept x with probability 1 in all the copies
of (P,V).
Soundness states that if x < L, then D should accept with probability at most
1/3. That is, S V∗(x) can produce an accepting view of V∗ with probability at
most 1/3. Equivalently, we may view S as a nd-query fixed-input resettable
prover, and show that the protocol (Pm,V∗) is nd-query fixed-input resettable
sound. Therefore, Theorem 25 and 26 are completed by the following lemmas,
respectively:
Lemma 27 (Resettably Sound Proofs). Suppose Π = (P,V) is a k = poly(n)-round
public-coin black-box zero-knowledge proof with soundness error 1/2. If m ≥ k log2 n
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and H is a family of q = poly(n)-wise independent hash-functions, then (Pm,V∗H) is
q-query fixed-input resettably-sound.
Lemma 28 (Resettably Sound Arguments). Suppose Π = (P,V) is a k = poly(n)-
round public-coin black-box zero-knowledge argument with soundness error 1/2. If
m ≥ k2 log2 n and H is a family of q = poly(n)-wise independent hash-functions, then
(Pm,V∗H) is q-query fixed-input resettably-sound.
Remark. Lemma 27 and 28 may be stronger than necessary in two ways. Firstly,
the definition of resettable soundness requires negligible soundness error, while
our main theorems only require soundness error 1/3. Secondly, the definition
of resettable soundness allows the resetting prover to interact with polynomi-
ally many copies of V∗h with uniformly and independently chosen h’s, while the
zero-knowledge simulator only interacts with one copy of V∗h for a uniformly
chosen h. This second difference is moot, however, because it is trivial to re-
duce a resetting attack on polynomially many copies of V∗h (with uniformly and
independently chosen h’s) to a resetting attack on a single copy of V∗h (with uni-
formly chosen h), with only a polynomial loss in success probability. Therefore,
in our proofs for Lemma 27 and 28, we only consider one copy of V∗h .
4.3.2 Proof of Lemma 27: Resettably-Sound Proofs
Using the soundness amplification theorem of [2], protocol (Pm,V∗H) has sound-
ness error at most 1/2m. Let Pˆ∗ be a q-query fixed-input resettable prover. Sup-
pose for the sake of contradiction that for some input x < L, V∗H accepts a re-
settable interaction with Pˆ∗ with probability 1/p(n) for some polynomial p. We
follow the strategy of [27] to use Pˆ∗ in order to break the soundness of (Pm,V∗H).
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Whenever Pˆ∗ succeeds in breaking resettable soundness, Pˆ∗ would have queried
V∗ for k verifier messages that together form an accepting transcript of Πm. A
cheating prover of Πm can therefore run Pˆ∗ internally, guess which queries of
Pˆ∗ will form the accepting transcript, and forward them to an outside honest
verifier of Πm. Since Pˆ∗ queries V∗ for at most q(n) messages, the probability of
guessing all the right queries is at least q−k (one guess for each round of Π). Note
that forwarding queries to an outside honest verifier does not lower the success
probability of Pˆ∗ since V∗ is identical to a honest verifier (they both respond with
random messages). Thus this cheating prover, using Pˆ∗, can break the sound-
ness of Πm with probability at least (1/p)q−k = 2−Θ(k log n). Since m ≥ k log2 n, we
have 2−m < 2−Θ(k log n) and reach a contradiction. 
4.3.3 Proof of Lemma 28: Resettably-Sound Arguments
We turn to prove our main result. Again we argue by contradiction. Suppose
Pˆ∗ is a q-query fixed-input resettable prover, and suppose Pˆ∗ convinces V∗H on
some input x < L with probability more than 1/p(n) for some polynomial p. We
cannot repeat the proof of Lemma 27 because parallel repetitions cannot reduce
the soundness of arguments beyond being negligibly small Instead, we directly
show a parallel repetition theorem for resettable soundness; that is, we relate
the resettable soundness of (Pm,V∗H) to the soundness of Π.
Proof Outline. The rest of this section describes how to construct a cheat-
ing prover T for Π. T runs Pˆ∗ internally and simulates V∗H in response to Pˆ
∗
queries. Every query made by Pˆ∗ is answered by a uniformly random reply.
This perfectly simulates V∗H since H is q-wise independent and Pˆ
∗ makes at most
102
q queries (and never makes the same query twice); at the end of the qth query, T
will have implicitly defined a hash function h ∈ H and simulated V∗h , and Pˆ∗ will
have successfully broken resettable soundness with probability 1/p(n) over the
choice of these random replies (i.e., generated an accepting view of V∗H).
To break the (stand-alone) soundness of Π, T chooses one of the m parallel
sessions and forward a complete set of Pˆ∗ queries in that session (one for each
round of Π) to an honest outside verifier V . The goal is to forward the queries
on which Pˆ∗ is able to convince V∗ = V∗H in protocol Π
m. This is challenging
because Pˆ∗ may have multiple queries for each round of Πm. While T must
decide to forward a query or not at the time of the query, Pˆ∗ can wait until all
queries are completed before choosing which queries to form an accepting view
of V∗. To overcome this obstacle, a key part of our analysis relies on rewinding
Pˆ∗ (note that at the same time, Pˆ∗ believes that it is rewinding V∗). Our strategy
is twofold. First we only forward queries that has some chance (preferably a
good chance) of being included a convincing transcript; this is done by doing
test-runs of Pˆ∗. Once we have forwarded a query, we force Pˆ∗ to use the query
to convince V∗, by repeatedly rewinding Pˆ∗.
We describe a transcript of Pˆ∗ as an alternating sequence of responses from
T and queries from Pˆ∗, [t1, s1, t2, s2, . . . ], where each Pˆ∗-query si is in fact a partial
transcript of Πm that ends with a prover message, awaiting a verifier response.
To avoid confusion, in our analysis, τ and 〈·〉 denote views of V∗ (transcripts of
Πm), while h and [·] denote transcripts of Pˆ∗ (transcripts of a resettable execution
of Πm). The goal of T is then to generate a full transcript h of Pˆ∗ in which Pˆ∗
generates a convincing transcript τ of (Pm,V∗), while simultaneously having the
foresight to forward (a session of) all the Pˆ∗-queries pertaining to τ to the exter-
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nal verifier V (i.e., all Pˆ∗-queries in h that are a prefix of τ). If so, T has broken
the soundness of Π, and we call this a successful simulation of Pˆ∗. Note that
because the randomness of Pˆ∗ is fixed, the behavior of Pˆ∗ is entirely determined
by the T -responses in a transcript.
We start with a brief description of T . T first fixes a random session ˜ ∈
{1, . . . ,m} to be forwarded. Then in k iterations (one for each round of Π), T
incrementally fixes a transcript of Pˆ∗ and forwards a Pˆ∗-query to V . In more
details, at the beginning of iteration i, T starts with a partial transcript hi =
[t1, s1, . . . , s`] of Pˆ∗ that ends with s` = τi, a query for the ith message of Π (h1 = [],
the empty transcript). Then:
Step 1. T forwards session ˜ of the query τi to V , and receives a response v
( ˜)
i .
Step 2. Fixing the reply v( ˜)i , T uniformly samples completions of the partial
transcript hi until a “successful” completion h is found; specifically, Pˆ∗ on
transcript h should produce an accepting view of V∗, τ, that extends the
query τi. To move onto the next iteration, let τi+1 be the length i + 1 prefix
of τ, and let hi+1 be the prefix of h up until Pˆ∗ makes the query τi+1.
During the analysis, we first use Raz’s lemma to show that because the num-
ber of sessions is large and ˜was chosen randomly, we may pretend v( ˜)i is nicely
chosen, conditioned on success, just like the other sessions (chosen by T in step
2). We also show that T rarely aborts.
Proof Details. We now introduce a series of hybrid simulators that formally
defines T ; all our hybrids generate truly random responses to Pˆ∗-queries so that
Pˆ∗ cannot distinguish the hybrids from V∗. We start with a hypothetical hybrid,
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and gradually move towards T .
Hybrid 1. Our first hybrid T (1) serves to introduce the general idea of how T
queries Pˆ∗ internally; T (1) does not yet forward messages to the external verifier
V .
T (1) builds a full transcript of Pˆ∗ in k + 1 iterations. In iteration i, T (1) fixes
an Pˆ∗-query τi for the ith message of Πm. This query should have a good chance
of being used by Pˆ∗ in an accepting transcript of Πm, and therefore is a good
candidate to forward externally. Note that fixing an Pˆ∗-query amounts to fixing
the transcript of Pˆ∗ up until the desired Pˆ∗-query is made.
We now describe T (1) in detail. In the very beginning, T (1) fixes a random
session ˜ ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; eventually the ˜th session will be forwarded externally.
After that, T (1) incrementally grows a transcript of Pˆ∗ in k iterations. During the
ith iteration, T (1) receives a partial transcript of Pˆ∗ from the previous iteration,
hi = [t1, s1, . . . , s` = τi], where τi is a Pˆ∗-query for the ith verifier message of Πm
(h1 = [], the empty transcript). As an invariant maintained by T (1), it should be
possible to extend hi into a full transcript of Pˆ∗ where Pˆ∗ outputs an accepting
view of V∗ containing the query τi. We call such a full transcript a successful
completion of hi. Each iteration can be further divided into two steps:
Step 1. T (1) does not forward τi to the external V ; instead it simulates a response
as follows. T (1) randomly samples a completion of hi into h, conditioned
on success (always possible due to the invariant). Let v( ˜)i be the response
to τi in the ˜th session in the successful completion h. Let h˜i be a partial
extension of the partial transcript hi where the session ˜ response to τi is
fixed to v( ˜)i (but the responses in other sessions are not specified).
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...
...
τi −→ −→ −→ −→ τ
˜
i−→
←− ←− v
˜
i←− ←− v
˜
i←−
−→ −→ −→ −→
...
τi+1 −→ −→ −→ −→ τ
˜
i+1−→
v ˜i+1←− v
˜
i+1←−
T V
Pˆ∗ V∗Hhi h˜i
hi+1 h˜i+1
Figure 4.1: In order to interact with an outside honest verifier V , the reduction T
internally maintains a partial interaction between the given resetting
prover, Pˆ∗, and the (supposedly resettably-sound) verifier V∗H. The
figure captures T after Step 1 of the i + 1st iteration, and illustrates
some of the notations we define in the analysis.
Step 2. T (1) now samples a completion of h˜i into h˜ conditioned on success (note
that h from the previous step is one such completion). Under transcript
h˜, Pˆ∗ would output an accepting view τ of V∗ (note that τ must extend τi).
Let τi+1 be the Pˆ∗ query for the i + 1st verifier message in τ (note that τi+1
extends τi by definition of success). T (1) then sets hi+1 to be the prefix of h˜
up to when Pˆ∗ makes the query τi+1. Note that the invariant holds since by
definition h˜ is a successful completion of hi+1.
Note that in Step 2 of the final (kth) iteration, T (1) simply outputs h˜ as a full
transcript of Pˆ∗ (there is no τk+1 to fix). Due to the invariant, T (1) always produce
a transcript of Pˆ∗, on which Pˆ∗ outputs an accepting transcript τ. Moreover, the
prefixes of τ would be the same τ1, . . . , τk that were “chosen” by T (1) in each
iteration (and would eventually be forwarded to the external verifier V in later
hybrids).
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Hybrid 2. Our second hybrid, T (2), describes a way to efficiently sample suc-
cessful completions in Step 2 of each iteration (Step 1 will be replaced with the
external verifier and is left alone for now). In Step 2, T (2) randomly completes
the given partial execution (h˜i) up to 100k2pq times, until a successful comple-
tion is found. If none of the completions are successful, T (2) aborts. Note that
conditioned on T (2) not aborting, the output distribution of T (2) is identical to T (1).
To show that T (2) aborts with small probability, suppose for now that T (2)
is allowed to sample an unbounded number of completions. Let us bound the
expected number of random completions that are needed to sample a successful
one. In the following analysis we distinguish between two probability spaces:
PrP[·] is used to measure probabilities over a single execution of Pˆ∗. On the
other hand, PrT [·] is used to measure probabilities over an execution of T (2) (with
unbounded number of completions) which includes rewinding and executing
Pˆ∗ multiple times.
Let Hi and H˜i be the set of possible partial transcripts of Pˆ∗ that is given to
T (2) in Step 1 and Step 2 of the ith iteration, respectively. Given h ∈ Hi (or H˜i), let
PrP[h] denote the probability that a transcript of Pˆ∗ has prefix h, and let PrT [h]
denote the probability that T (2) is given h in the ith iteration; similarly, PrP[· | h]
and PrT [· | h] are probabilities conditioned on these events occurring. Let Ah be
the event (over the Pˆ∗ probability space) that a transcript of Pˆ∗ has prefix h and
is a successful completion of h; as a special case, A = A∅ is just the event that Pˆ∗
outputs an accepting transcript. Also let Ri be the random variable (over the T (2)
probability space) that denotes the number of completions performed by T (2) in
step 2 of iteration i.
First we give a claim. Intuitively, the claim says that the probability of T (2)
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fixing h is proportional to the probability of successfully completing h; the nor-
malizing factor is simply PrP[A], the probability that Pˆ∗ produces an accepting
transcript.
Claim 29. Let h ∈ H˜i. PrT [h] PrP[A] = PrP[Ah].
Proof. Recall that the behavior of Pˆ∗ is entirely determined by the random mes-
sages generated by T (2). Let us consider a complete binary tree T of depth nd
that represents all possible length nd random bit-strings generated by T (2). Then
every partial execution of Pˆ∗ corresponds to a node in T based on the verifier
messages received so far by Pˆ∗ in h.
Let us focus on the leaf nodes in T since they occur with equal probability.
Given h, define L(h) to be the set of leaf nodes in T that are a children of h; these
nodes corresponds to possible completions of h. We also define G(h) to be the
subset of L(h) that corresponds to successful completions of h (i.e. leaves where
the event Ah is true). Finally let L0 = L(∅) be all the leaf nodes, and G0 = G(∅) be
the subset of L0 that corresponds to executions where Pˆ∗ produces an accepting
transcript.
Recall that our goal is to prove that
Pr
T
[h] Pr
P
[A] = Pr
P
[Ah] .
Clearly
Pr
P
[A] =
|G0|
|L0| PrP[A
h] =
|G(h)|
|L0| (4.1)
To expand PrT [h], let h˜1, h2, . . . , hi, h˜i = h be the prefixes of h given to T (1) in pre-
vious steps of previous iterations. As we see below, the expression for PrT [h]
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telescopes:
Pr
T
[h] = Pr
T
[h˜1]
i∏
`=2
Pr
T
[h` | h˜`−1] Pr
T
[h˜` | h`]
=
|G(h˜1)|
|G0|
i∏
`=2
|G(h`)|
|G(h˜`−1)|
|G(h˜`)|
|G(h`)|
=
|G(h˜i)|
|G0| =
|G(h)|
|G0| (4.2)
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) together gives the claim. 
Now we bound the expected number of samples needed to find a successful
completion.
Lemma 30. ET [Ri] ≤ pq.
Proof. First expand ET [Ri] by conditioning on the transcript h fixed in Step 1:
E
T
[Ri] =
∑
h∈H˜i
Pr
T
[h]E
T
[Ri | h] (4.3)
Recall that in Step 2, T (2) samples random completions of h until a successful
completion is found. Therefore
E
T
[Ri | h] = 1PrP[Ah | h] ⇒ ET [Ri] =
∑
h∈H˜i
Pr
T
[h]
1
PrP[Ah | h] (4.4)
By expanding the RHS of Claim 29 and rearranging terms, we have
Pr
T
[h] Pr
P
[A] = Pr
P
[Ah] = Pr
P
[h] Pr
P
[Ah | h]
⇒ Pr
T
[h]
1
PrP[Ah | h] = PrP [h]
1
PrP[A]
≤ pPr
P
[h]
since we assumed PrP[A] ≥ 1/p. Substituting this back into (4.4) gives
E
T
[Ri] ≤ p
∑
h∈H˜i
Pr
P
[h] (4.5)
109
Finally, we may break up the set H˜i based on the length of h which ranges from
1 to q (where length is the number of Pˆ∗-queries). Since each transcript of Pˆ∗ has
exactly one length ` prefix:
E
T
[Ri] ≤ p
q∑
`=1
∑
h∈H˜i,|h|=`
Pr
P
[h] ≤ p
q∑
`=1
1 = pq

Finally, we show that 100k2pq random completions are enough for T (2).
Lemma 31. T (2) aborts with probability at most 1/5.
Proof. Since ET [Ri] =
∑
h˜i PrT [h˜i]ET [Ri | h˜i] = ET [ET [Ri | h˜i]] ≤ pq, the Markov
inequality states that the probability of T (2) fixing an h˜i such that ET [Ri | h˜i] ≥
10kpq is at most 1/(10k). For each “good” h˜i where ET [Ri | h˜i] < 10kpq, we apply
the Markov inequality again to obtain PrT [Ri ≥ 100k2pq | h˜i] ≤ 1/(10k). Using the
union bound we see that in any iteration, T (2) aborts in Step 1 with probability
at most 1/(5k). A final union bound over k iterations of Step 2 shows that T (2)
aborts overall with probability at most 1/5. 
Hybrid 3. Our third and final hybrid T (3) = T differs from T (2) in Step 1 of
each iteration. Recall that some session ˜ is chosen randomly as the forwarding
session. Instead of generating v( ˜)i in Step 1, T
(3) asks the external honest verifier
V for a verifier message. Because Π is public-coin, T (3) can continue to complete
partial transcripts of Pˆ∗ even if session ˜ is forwarded to V externally.
Given transcript hi = [t1, s1, . . . , s` = τi] in iteration i, T (3) forwards session ˜
of τi to V , and uses the response from V as v
( ˜)
i in Step 2.
4 Suppose for now that
4Strictly speaking, the interaction between T (3) and the honest verifier V is non-resetting.
Therefore, instead of forwarding session ˜ of query τi to V , T (3) simply sends the last prover
message in session ˜ of the query τi to V . For ease of exposition, we continue to use the phrase
“T (3) forwards the query τi” to mean the above.
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T (3) does not abort and terminates successfully. Then Pˆ∗ would have generated
an accepting transcript τ of Πm. Since τ1, . . . , τk are prefixes of τ, session ˜ of τ
would be an accepting transcript of Π consisting of forwarded prover messages
and responses from V . This breaks the soundness of Π.
Therefore, it remains to show that T (3) is successful with probability more
than 1/2. We will use Raz’s lemma [63, Claim 5.1] in analogy with [38, 36] to
show that v( ˜)i as generated by T
(1) and T (2) is actually very close to the uniformly
random messages generated by the honest verifier V . First we cite Raz’s lemma
as it appears in [37, Lemma 5]:
Lemma 32. Let
{
U j
}
j∈[m] be independent random variables on U with probability dis-
tribution PU j . Let W be an event in Um and Pr[W] be measured according to the joint
probability distribution Π jPU j . Then
m∑
j=1
∆(U j|W,U j) ≤
√
m log
(
1
Pr[W]
)
where ∆ is the statistical distance between distributions, and U j|W is the jth component
of an element in Um chosen based on the joint probability distribution Π jPU j , condi-
tioned on W.
In other words, let
{
U j
}
j
be independent random variables, and let W be
an event over Π jU j. If W occurs with high probability and there are many U j,
then on average over j, sampling U j conditioned on W does not differ much
from simply sampling U j. Lemma 32 allows us the bound the change in success
probability when T (3) forwards messages from a random session to V .
Lemma 33. T (3) fails with probability at most 3/10 + O(1/ log n).
Proof. We first construct a series of finer hybrids, T1, . . . ,Tk+1, where Ti proceeds
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as T (2) until the start of iteration i (no forwarding), and continues as T (3) after-
wards (with forwarding)5. Observe that T1 = T (3) and Tk+1 = T (2).
Consider two neighboring hybrids, Ti and Ti+1, which differ only in iteration
i. Let h be the partial execution given in iteration i. For j ∈ [m], let U j be the
random variable that denotes all the additional session j messages sent by T to
randomly complete h, i.e.,
{
U j
}
j
are independent and uniformly random. Let
Wh be the event that the random messages U1, . . . ,Um together produced a suc-
cessful completion of h. By definition, the distribution of v( ˜)i produced by Ti+1
(i.e., T (2)) is just the first message of U ˜|Wh. On the other hand, the distribution
of v( ˜)i produced by Ti (i.e., T
(3)) is just the uniform distribution, just like the first
message of U j.
Since Ti−1 and Ti only differ in how v
( ˜)
i is produced, their difference in success
probability can be bounded by the statistical difference in the distributions of
v( ˜)i . This is in turn bounded by:∑
h∈Hi
m∑
j=1
Pr
T
[h] Pr[ ˜ = j]∆(U j|Wh,U j)=
∑
h∈Hi
Pr
T
[h]
1m
m∑
j=1
∆(U j|Wh,U j)
 (*)
Lemma 32 states that for any event W,
1
m
m∑
j=1
∆(U j|W,U j) ≤
√
1
m
log
(
1
Pr[W]
)
Observe that before iteration i, Ti and Ti+1 are identical to T (2). When T (2) does
not abort, T (2) is identical to T (1). In that case, Lemma 30 along with the Markov
inequality implies that except with probability 1/(10k), T (2) fixes a “good” h with
ET [Ri | h] ≤ 10kpq, so that
Pr[Wh] = Pr
P
[Ah | h] = 1
ET [Ri | h] ≥
1
10kpq
5This still makes sense since Π is a public-coin protocol; the outside verifier can directly
generate a verifier response for any round of the protocol.
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We can now break the sum in (*) into two parts. Observe that∑
bad h ∈ Hi
Pr
T
[h]
 1m
m∑
j=1
∆(U j|Wh,U j)
 ≤ ∑
bad h ∈ Hi
Pr
T
[h] ≤ 1
10k
since statistical distances are upper bounded by 1, and∑
good h ∈ Hi
Pr
T
[h]
 1m
m∑
j=1
∆(U j|Wh,U j)

≤
∑
good h ∈ Hi
Pr
T
[h]
√
1
m
log(10kpq) ≤
√
1
m
log(10kpq)
since
∑
h∈Hi PrT [h] = 1. Together, they show that (*) is at most
1
10k
+
√
1
m
log (10kpq) =
1
10k
+ O
 1
k
√
log n

since m ≥ k2 log2 n. Summing up over the hybrids, and recalling that T (2) fails
with probability at most 1/5 (Lemma 31), T (3) fails with probability at most
1
5
+ k
 110k + O
 1
k
√
log n
 ≤ 310 + O
 1√
log n


Lemma 33 shows that T is successful with probability > 1/2, and completes
the proof of Lemma 28.
4.3.4 On Expected Simulation
As with most lower bounds for black-box zero-knowledge, a careful reading
reveals that Theorems 25 and 26 also apply to more liberal definitions of zero-
knowledge, such as ε-zero-knowledge6 [20]. In particular, the theorems also
apply to zero-knowledge with expected polynomial time simulators.
6In ε-zero-knowledge, the indistinguishability gap between the view of V∗ and the view gen-
erated by the simulator is allowed to be some inverse polynomial approaching zero, as opposed
to negligible.
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First observe that expected time simulation (say with a polynomial expected
running time q(n)) achieves ε-zero-knowledge with ε = 1/q+ ν for some negligi-
ble function ν: simply by cut off the simulation after (q(n))2 steps and apply the
Markov inequality. Next observe the zero-knowledge property is only required
to show that the decision processD is complete for language L with probability
2/3. In the case of ε-zero-knowledge, we simply need ε < 1/3 to hold, which is
true for sufficiently large n.
4.4 Impossibility in the Bare Public Key Model
Many setup assumptions have been used to construct concurrent zero-knowledge
with better efficiency than the standard model. For example, in the CRS (com-
mon reference string) model, even non-interactive zero-knowledge is possible
[22]. Other “weaker” setups have produced varying results, and we will be
concentrating on the bare public key model.
In the Bare Public-Key (BPK) model [13], every player has a public key that
can be accessed by any other player. When a protocol is repeated in parallel,
we assume that the honest parties use fresh independent public keys for each
parallel session. By assuming that all public keys are properly registered before
a protocol begins, Canetti, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [13] showed that
constant-round, private-coin arguments exist for NP even if we require black-
box resettable zero-knowledge, a property that implies black-box concurrent zero-
knowledge. In contrast, in the plain model, O˜(log n) rounds are required for
concurrent black-box zero-knowledge proofs [14]. It is therefore natural to ask
if the BPK setup can overcome our lowerbound for public-coin zero-knowledge
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protocols.
In this section we extend our impossibility result from Sect. 4.3 to the BPK
model. We actually extend our result to a larger class of slightly-private-coin
protocols, defined with the following properties:
1. The first message of the protocol, from the verifier, is allowed to be private
coin. All other subsequent verifier messages are public-coin, i.e., indepen-
dent segments of the verifier’s random tape.
2. At the end of the protocol, the verifier may run a private coin algorithm
to accept or reject the interaction. In particular, the verifier’s decision may
depend on the private coins used to generate the first message.
Note that every public-coin protocol in the BPK model can be transformed into
a slightly-private-coin protocol, because
1. The verifier can send its public key to the prover in the first message (prop-
erty 1).
2. The verifier can base its acceptance decision on its secret key (property 2).
Our modified theorem is the following:
Theorem 34. Suppose language L has a k = poly(n)-round slightly-private-coin black-
box zero-knowledge argument Π with negligible soundness error in n. Ifm ≥ (k2 log2 k) log2 n
and Πm is zero-knowledge, then L ∈ BPP.
Recall that in the analysis of Theorem 26, we treat the black-box zero-knowledge
simulator S as a resetting prover Pˆ∗ of (Pm,V∗), and use Pˆ∗ to construct a ma-
chine T , which in turn contradicts the soundness of Π. We now have a problem
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whenever T needs to sample a successful completion of a partial transcript of
Pˆ∗, since T does not know whether the external verifier V would accept or re-
ject the transcript produced by Pˆ∗. To overcome this problem, we follow an
approach similar to [9, 36] by guessing whether V would accept or reject based
on whether the other verifiers, simulated by T , accept or reject their respective
parallel sessions.
Proof. We extend the analysis of Theorem 26 in analogy with [36]. We first de-
scribe how T guesses if V accepts or rejects in the forwarded session ˜. When-
ever T completes a partial execution of Pˆ∗, let z− ˜ be the number of sessions,
excluding session ˜, in which S produced a rejecting view. We exclude session ˜
for the aforementioned reason that without knowing the private key (or private
coins) of the external verifier V , T cannot tell if V will accept or reject the view.
Let w− ˜ be a Bernoulli random variable with Pr[w− ˜ = 1] = 2−νz− ˜, where ν is
an asymptotically small parameter to be determined later. w− ˜ corresponds to
T ’s guess: If w− ˜ = 1, T will consider the completion successful, and vice versa.
Intuitively, T is more likely to consider a completion as a success if the number
of rejecting sessions is fewer.
To facilitate the analysis, we also consider a hypothetical but more symmet-
ric process. Given a transcript generated by Pˆ∗, let z be the number of sessions,
including session ˜, in which Pˆ∗ produced a rejecting view. Similarly, let w be
the Bernoulli random variable with Pr[w = 1] = 2−νz.
We now prove Theorem 34 with the same framework as Theorem 26, using
the following modified hybrids. Hybrids T (1), T (2) and T (3) are constructed as
before, except they now compute z and w to determine if a completion is suc-
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cessful. The final machine, T , differs from T (3) by computing z− ˜ and w− ˜ instead.
Claim 35. The probability that T (1) generates a rejecting view in session ˜ is at most:
3
m
(− log ν2
ν
+ 4
)
Proof. The proof of this claim essentially follows from an analysis in [36] (which
contained more general parameters). For the sake of completeness, we include
their analysis without the extra parameters here.
Before introducing the public key extension, T (1) simply samples a random
successful transcript of Pˆ∗ (see Claim 29). After adopting the new notion of
success based on w, T (1) now samples a random transcript of Pˆ∗ conditioned on
w = 1. That is, T (1) outputs a transcript of Pˆ∗ that generates rejecting views in j
sessions with probability proportional to 2−ν j.
Since T (1) chooses ˜ randomly, it is enough to bound the expected number
of rejecting sessions. Let p j be the probability that in a random execution of
Pˆ∗, the output view contains j rejecting sessions. Then, the expected number of
rejecting verifiers is ∑m
j=0 jp j2
−ν j∑m
j=0 p j2−ν j
(4.6)
[36] gives a bound of (4.6) with more general parameters. For the sake of com-
pleteness, we include their analysis below without the extra parameters.
Recall that by assumption, Pˆ∗ generates an output view in which all sessions
accept with probability at least 1/3. Therefore we can lower bound the denomi-
nator of (4.6) by
m∑
j=0
p j2−ν j ≥ p0 ≥ 1/3 .
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To upper bound the numerator, we use the following inequality:
∞∑
j=0
j2−ν j =
2−ν
(1 − 2−ν)2 ≤
1
(1 − 2−ν)2 ≤
4
ν2
.
The last inequality follow from the fact that 1 − 2−ν ≥ ν/2 for small ν. Directly
apply this bound to the numerator (using p j ≤ 1) gives an overly loose bound
since ν is asymptotically small. Instead, we split the expression of the numerator
at some parameter t:
m∑
j=0
jp j2−ν j ≤ t
m∑
j=0
p j2−ν j +
m−t∑
j=1
jpt+ j2−ν(t+ j)
≤ t + 4
ν2
2−νt .
Setting t = − log ν2/ν, we see that the expected number of rejecting verifiers is at
most
3
(− log ν2
ν
+ 4
)
.
Since T (1) chooses ˜ uniformly from {1, . . . , k}, the probability that T (1) outputs a
view that rejects in session ˜ is
3
m
(− log ν2
ν
+ 4
)
.

Lemma 36. The probability that T (2) aborts is at most 1/5. Otherwise, the output of
T (2) is identical to T (1).
Proof. By computing w and z, there are now more “successful” executions than
before (originally, only executions where z = 0, i.e., no rejecting sessions, are
successful). Therefore, T (2) now aborts with less probability than before, which
is bounded by 1/5 (Lemma 31). 
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Lemma 37. T (3) fails to produce an accepting view in session ˜with probability at most
3
m
(− log ν2
ν
+ 4
)
+
3
10
+ O
(
1
log n
)
Proof. This follows from Claim 35, and by applying Raz’s lemma in the same
manner as in Lemma 33. 
Lemma 38. The output of T (3) and T differs statistically by at most kν.
Proof. T (3) and T differs in how a successful completion is recognized. For any
completion, the difference in probability of it being considered successful by T (3)
and T is:
Pr[w− ˜ = 1] − Pr[w = 1] = 2−νz− ˜ − 2−νz ≤ 2−ν(z−1) − 2−νz ≤ 1 − 2−ν ≤ ν .
For each round of protocol Π, T (3) and T repeatedly perform the same task (com-
pleting partial transcript of S ) until w = 1 or w− ˜ = 1, respectively. Therefore the
statistical difference between the two process is at most kν. 
Combining Lemma 37 and 38, we see that T fails to break the soundness of
Π with probability at most
3
m
(− log ν2
ν
+ 4
)
+
3
10
+ O
 1√
log n
 + kν
By setting ν = 1/
√
km, the expression becomes
3
√
k
m
log(km) +
12
m
+
3
10
+ O
 1√
log n
 + √ km
Since m ≥ k2 log2 k log2 n, we conclude that T fails with probability at most 3/10+
o(1). That is, T succeeds with non-negligible probability, contradicting the sound-
ness of Π. 
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4.5 Public-Coin Black-Box Bounded Concurrent ZK
In this section we give a family BOUNDEDCONCZK of public-coin proofs for
NP, parametrized by k. The proof with parameter k has 2k3 + 4 rounds, and
is k-bounded concurrent zero-knowledge assuming the existence of one-way
functions, whenever k = ω(log n) where n is the input size. BOUNDEDCONCZK
requires the use of statistically binding commitment schemes.
4.5.1 The Protocol
Our construction of BOUNDEDCONCZK is similar in spirit to the concurrent
zero-knowledge protocol of [64]. Given a language L ∈ NP and a parameter
k, we construct a two stage public-coin proof (P,V) as follows. In stage one,
2k3 rounds of messages are exchanged where in each round, the prover gives a
statistically binding commitment of a random bit pi, and the verifier responds
with a random bit vi; we call pi = vi a correct guess (note that unlike [64], the
verifier does not commit to the bits vi). In stage two, (P,V) runs a 4-round public-
coin witness indistinguishable proof of the modified NP statement “either x ∈ L
or that pi = vi for k3 + k2/2 values of i”, where x is the problem instance. This
can be instantiated with a parallel repetition of the Blum Hamiltonicity protocol
[10] with 2-round statistically binding commitments constructed from one-way
functions. The verifier accepts if the prover is successful with the stage two
proof.
We choose 2k3 rounds of interaction in Stage One of BOUNDEDCONCZK for
the following two reasons. First, by the Chernoff bound, we expect that no ad-
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PROTOCOL BOUNDEDCONCZK
Common Input: An instance x of a language L ∈ NP and a parameter k.
Stage One: For i from 1 to 2k3:
P → V : Commit to a random bit pi using a statistically binding com-
mitment.
V → P : Reply with a random bit vi.
Stage Two: A 4-round public-coin witness indistinguishable proof (e.g., par-
allel repetitions of the Blum Hamiltonicity protocol [10]) of the NP state-
ment:(
there exist distinct i1, . . . , ik3+ 12 k2 s.t. pi j = vi j for all j
)
∨ (x ∈ L)
Figure 4.2: Our public-coin black-box bounded concurrent zero-knowledge pro-
tocol.
versarial prover can have more than k3+O(
√
k3) correct guesses. Hence BOUND-
EDCONCZK is sound. On the other hand, a zero-knowledge simulator can re-
peatedly rewind the verifier until it gets a correct guess. Intuitively (and shown
formally later), in each round of stage one, the simulator can set one extra pi = vi
for some session, in addition to “natural luck” (that gives correct guesses for half
of the sessions). Since the number of sessions is bounded by k, the simulator
is able to have k3 + O(k3/k) = k3 + O(k2) correct guesses per session. This pro-
vides the simulator with a trapdoor to simulate stage two of the protocol, and
hence BOUNDEDCONCZK is bounded concurrent zero-knowledge. We remark
that k3 was chosen for the sake of simplicity and is not optimized. We show
completeness and soundness below.
BOUNDEDCONCZK is clearly complete. A prover given a correct problem
instance and witness pair, (x ∈ L,w), can commit to random bits in stage one,
and use w to successfully complete the stage two proof.
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We next show that BOUNDEDCONCZK has negligible soundness error. Sup-
pose x < L. Then there are two ways for the prover to mislead the verifier:
1. The prover may have pi = vi for k3 + k2/2 (or more) values of i either by
breaking the binding property of the commitment, or by guessing luckily.
The former occurs with negligible probability since the commitment is sta-
tistically binding. The latter occurs with probability e−k/4 by the Chernoff
bound7.
2. Otherwise, the prover may break the soundness of the stage two proof,
which occurs with probability at most 2−k due to the parallel repetitions.
Since k = ω(log n), both e−k/4 and 2−k are negligible in n.
4.5.2 Black-Box Bounded Concurrent ZK
We construct a black box simulator S such that given an adversarial verifier, V∗,
S V
∗ generates the view of V∗ in BOUNDEDCONCZK, provided that the number
of concurrent sessions m satisfies m ≤ k. The goal of S is to obtain as many
correct guesses as possible by rewinding V∗. Towards that goal, S employs a
simple greedy strategy to incrementally generate and fix a partial view of V∗.
Whenever V∗ sends S a first stage message vi, S checks if it had guessed correctly
when committing to pi. If so, S lengthens the partial view of V∗ to include this
correct guess. Otherwise, S rewinds V∗ back to the previously generated partial
view. This “incremental strategy” is somewhat reminiscent of [46], but since
our protocol is public-coin, the actual analysis is quite different. Additionally,
7Here we use the following form of Chernoff bound. If {Xi} are i.i.d. satisfying Pr[Xi = 0] =
Pr[Xi = 1] = 1/2, then Pr[
∑n
i=1 Xi ≥ n/2 + a] ≤ e−2a2/n
122
we take care to always simulate the stage two proof in a straight line fashion
without rewinds, so that we may use a simple hybrid argument to show the
zero-knowledge property.
We use superscripts to distinguish messages from different sessions. To pre-
vent S from focusing too much on one particular session, we keep m counters,
c1, . . . , cm, to record how much “work” has been done in each session. In gen-
eral, S proceeds as follows to incrementally fix the view (originally the empty
view is fixed). When asked to provide a prover message:
1. S commits to a fresh random bit for each stage one prover message.
2. For each stage two proof, S aborts if in this session, pi = vi for less than
k3 + k2/2 values of i. Otherwise, S uses this as a witness to generate the
prover messages in the stage two proof.
When receiving a verifier message:
3. If S receives a message v ji (from session j) and c
j < 2k2, it checks if the com-
mitment to p ji is part of the fixed partial view. If yes, S simply continues,
“giving up” on this guess. Otherwise, S checks if p ji = v
j
i . If yes, S extends
the fixed partial view up to message v ji and increments c
j; in this case we
say v ji is rigged. If p
j
i , v
j
i , then S rewinds V
∗ to start a fresh continuation
from the previously fixed partial view.
4. If S receives the second stage two verifier message from any session (e.g.,
the challenge message of the Blum Hamiltonicity protocol), it extends the
fixed partial view up to the just received verifier message. As a conse-
quence, all stage two proofs are simulated by S in a straight-line fashion
without rewinds.
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5. If S has performed k − 1 rewinds without rigging a message or encounter-
ing a stage two verifier message, and on the kth try again receives v ji , p
j
i
where p ji is not fixed and c
j < 2k2, S simply gives up and pretend to rig v ji
anyway (albeit incorrectly). That is, S extends the fixed partial view up to
message v ji and increments c
j.
The next two claims show that S is a k-bounded black-box zero-knowledge sim-
ulator when k ∈ ω(log n).
Claim 39. S runs in (strict) polynomial time.
Proof. S performs at most km(2k2) rewinds, which is polynomial in n. 
Claim 40. If x ∈ L and m ≤ k, S V∗(x, z) and ViewPV∗(x, z) are computationally indistin-
guishable over n.
Proof. We introduce a series of hybrids.
Hybrid 1. Our first hybrid S 1 is given witness w to the statement x ∈ L. S 1
proceeds identically as S until a stage two proof is reached. S 1 aborts if S aborts,
but uses the witness w instead of the various pi’s to complete the stage two
proof. Even though S performs many rewinds, S never rewinds a partial stage
two proof. Therefore, S V∗(x, z) and S V∗1 (x, z) are computationally indistinguishable
because the stage two proof is witness indistinguishable.
Hybrid 2. Our second hybrid S 2 is identical to S 1 except that it samples two
random bits for each stage one commitment pi and qi. S 2 commits to pi, but
checks vi against qi. Since S 1 gives polynomially many commitments and run
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in polynomial time, and since each commitment is computationally hiding and
independent from the rest of the execution of S 1 (stage two proofs are provided
using w), S V∗1 (x, z) and S
V∗
2 (x, z) are computationally indistinguishable.
Hybrid 3. Our third hybrid S 3 is identical to S 2 except that S 3 always gives
a stage two proof using witness w even if S 2 aborts. To see that S V
∗
2 (x, z) and
S V
∗
3 (x, z) are computationally indistinguishable, it suffices to show that S 2 aborts
with negligible probability.
Observe that whenever S extends the fixed partial view (either by rigging
a commitment, or by encountering a verifier challenge in a stage two proof),
at most one commitment from each session with less than 2k2 rigged messages
is fixed as part of the simulator output. This is because before encountering a
second commitment in any session, S would first try to rig the first commitment.
For each session, S rigs at most 2k2 stage one commitments and encounter at
most one stage two verifier challenge. Therefore, the number of commitments
fixed per session without rigging is at most (k − 1)(2k2 + 1) = 2k3 − (2k2 − k + 1).
In other words, every session will have at least 2k2 − k + 1 commitments rigged.
We now show that except with negligible probability, S 2 will have k3 + k2/2
correct guesses per session. Recall that the guesses of S 2, qi, are independent
from V∗’s responses since these guesses play no part in the commitments sent to
V∗. Therefore, except with probability poly(n)2−k, every rigged commitment is a
correct guess. Next, for the 2k3 − (2k2 − k + 1) ≥ 2k3 − 2k2 messages that are not
rigged, we apply the Chernoff bound to see that except with probability e−O(k),
we should have at least (k3 − k2)− k2/4 = k3 − 5k2/4 correct guesses. Thus, except
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with negligible probability8, we have a total of (k3−5k2/4)+(2k2−k+1) ≥ k3+k2/2
correct guesses as desired.
Final step. S 3 is now identical to P (sends identically distributed messages)
except that it may rewind V during the execution. But S 3 only rewinds if qi , vi,
an event independent from the protocol execution. Therefore S V∗3 (x, z) is identical
to ViewPV∗(x, z). This concludes the proof. 
4.6 A Non-Black-Box Public-Coin Parallel ZK Argument
4.6.1 The Protocol
Our non-black-box public-coin parallel zero-knowledge argument is similar to
the non-black-box public-coin bounded-concurrent zero-knowledge argument
of Barak [3]. Our argument PARALLELZKARG is described in Figure 4.3 which
utilizes an additional relation RS defined in Figure 4.4. PARALLELZKARG is
constant round, and can be based on collision resistant hash-functions. Intu-
itively, the zero-knowledge simulator will use a witness of the relation RS as a
trapdoor.
In our construction, c denotes a vector, and c−i denotes the same vector with
the ith element removed (i.e., c−1 is one shorter than c); {Hn}n denotes a family
of collision resistant hash-functions indexed by integer n; { fs}s denotes a family
of pseudorandom functions indexed by s ∈ {0, 1}∗; and, Com(x; r) denotes a
statistically binding commitment of x using randomness r. We also make use of
8Recall again that 2−k and e−O(k) are negligible in n since k = ω(log n).
126
a witness-indistinguishable universal argument of knowledge, WI UARG [4],
because the relation RS is quasi-polynomial time (nlog n) instead of polynomial
time.
PROTOCOL PARALLELZKARG
Common Input: An instance x of a language L ∈ NP with witness relation RL.
Stage One:
V → P: Send h← Hn.
P→ V : Send c = Com(0n).
V → P: Send r ← {0, 1}3n.
Stage Two:
P⇔ V : A WI UARG 〈PUA,VUA〉 proving the OR of the following statements:
1. ∃ w ∈ {0, 1}poly(|x|) s.t. RL(x,w) = 1.
2. ∃ 〈Π,m, i, s,h, c〉 s.t. RS (〈h, c, r〉 , 〈Π,m, i, s,h, c〉) = 1.
Figure 4.3: A public-coin non-black-box parallel zero-knowledge protocol.
Instance: A triplet 〈h, c, r〉 ∈ Hn × {0, 1}poly(n) × {0, 1}3n.
Witness: 〈Π,m, i, s,h, c〉: A program Π ∈ {0, 1}∗, an integer m, an index i ∈ [m], a
seed s, a m-vector of hash functions h = (h1, · · · , hm) ∈ Hmn , and a m-vector of
commitments c = (c1, · · · , cm).
Relation: RS (〈h, c, r〉 , 〈Π,m, i, s, c,h〉) = 1 if and only if:
1. i ∈ [m], |s| ≤ n
2. Π(c) = r = (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ {0, 1}mn within nlog n steps, and ri = r.
3. h = hi, c = ci.
4. For j ∈ [m] we have c j = Com(m‖h j(h− j)‖h j(Π); fs( j)).
Figure 4.4: RS , an NP relation that extend Barak’s construction [3] for parallel
repetitions.
Simplifying Assumptions. We remark that the relation presented in Fig. 4.4 is
slightly oversimplified and only works when {Hn}n is collision resistant against
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“slightly” super-polynomially sized circuits. To make it work assuming col-
lision resistance against polynomially sized circuits, one should use a “good”
error-correcting code ECC (i.e., with constant distance and with polynomial-time
encoding and decoding), and replace the commitmentsCom(m‖h j(h− j)‖h j(Π); fs( j))
with Com(m‖h j(h− j)‖h j(ECC(Π)); fs( j)) [4]. We also assume that Com is a one-
message commitment scheme. Such schemes can be constructed based on any
one-to-one one-way function. At the cost of a small complication, the one-
message scheme could have been replaced by the 2-message commitment scheme
of [50], which can be based on any one-way function [35].
4.6.2 Completness and Soundness
PARALLELZKARG is clearly complete; an honest prover can use the real wit-
ness to complete the Stage Two argument. The soundness of PARALLELZKARG
follows from the same ideas as Barak’s non-black-box zero-knowledge protocol.
Lemma 41. PARALLELZKARG has negligible soundness error against polynomial-
time bounded provers.
Proof. The main idea is that any deterministic program Π produces only one
output for any given input. When the prover commits to c, it can no longer
change the program Π, m or h because Com is statistically binding and Hn is
collision resistant. Since we use a pseudo-random function to determine the
randomness of the commitments, the value of Π(c) would only depend on i and
s. Since there are m = poly(n) values of i and 2n values of s, Π(c) may take on
at most poly(n)2n values after the commitment c is fixed. On the other hand,
the verifier chooses r ∈ {0, 1}3n randomly after the prover fixes c. Therefore, the
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probability that there exists some i and s so that the ith component of Π(c) is r is
less than poly(n)2n/23n < 2−n and is negligible.
We now prove the lemma formally. Suppose the contrary that some effi-
cient cheating prover P∗ breaks soundness of PARALLELZKARG with polyno-
mial probability on an infinite sequence of inputs {xn}n, xn ∈ {0, 1}n \ L. Using
P∗, we construct an adversaryA that acts either as a collision finder forHn, or a
cheating sender for Com.
A runs P∗ internally. On input 1n, A starts by receiving a random h ← Hn,
and presents h to P∗ as the first message of PARALLELZKARG; P∗ responds by
generating a commitment c. The following step is then repeated twice: A sends
a random challenge r ∈ {0, 1}3n to P∗, and uses the witness extractor of the Stage
Two UARG on P∗ to extract a (potentially quasi-polynomial-length) witness of
the relation RS (we cannot extract a witness w ∈ RL(x) since x < L). Because
P∗ breaks soundness with noticeable probability, A succeeds in extracting two
witnesses, 〈Π,m, i, s, c,h〉 and 〈Π′,m′, i′, s′, c′,h′〉, to the statements 〈h, c, r〉 and
〈h, c, r′〉 (where r and r′ are independent and uniform in {0, 1}3n), also with no-
ticeable probability. We split into two cases:
Case 1: Π , Π′ or m , m′ or h−i , h′−i′ .
By the definition of RS , we have
c = ci = Com(m‖h(h−i)‖h(Π); fs(i))
= c′i′ = Com(m
′‖h(h′−i′)‖h(Π′); fs′(i′))
If Π , Π′, then eitherA has found a collision to h (if h(Π) = h(Π′)), orA has
broken the binding property of Com (by decommiting c to two different
strings, ·‖h(Π) and ·‖h(Π′)). These conclusions hold in the same manner if
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m , m′ or h−i , h′−i′ .
Case 2: Π = Π′ and m = m′ and h−i = h′−i′ .
In this case, given the first witness 〈Π,m, i, s, c,h〉, the value of Π′(c′)i′ is
fixed modulo the value of i′ ∈ [m] and s′ ∈ {0, 1}n; that is, Π′(c′)i′ can take
on at most m·2n values. However, r′ ∈ {0, 1}3n is chosen independently from
the first witness. Therefore Π′(c′)i′ = r′ (required for this case to occur) is
possible with probability at most m · 2n/23n < 2−n.
Therefore we conclude that except with exponentially small probability (when
Case 2 occurs),A either finds a collision for h, or breaks the binding property of
Com. This gives the desired contradiction. 
4.6.3 Parallel ZK
Given a m-session parallel adversarial verifier V∗, we construct a (non-black-
box) zero-knowledge simulator S = S V∗ as follows. On input x and auxiliary
input z, S = S V∗(x, z) first picks a random s ∈ {0, 1}n to fix the pseudorandom
function fs, and starts a straight-line simulation of V∗’s view. During the simu-
lation, V∗ starts by opening m sessions of PARALLELZKARG and sending hash
functions hi in session i. S is expected to respond in session i with some com-
mitment ci, after which V∗ responds with a string ri. The crux of the simulation
is for S to commit to a program Π such that Π(c) = r (including the case where
some components of r are aborts). But V∗ is just such a program. Therefore, S
sets Π to V∗(x, z), and sets ci = Com(m‖hi(h−i)‖hi(Π); fs(i)). By construction, we
now have for each session i, (〈hi, ci, ri〉 , 〈Π,m, i, s, c,h〉) ∈ RS ; this is because the
messages r = (r1, . . . , rm) are indeed what V∗ outputs given c. These witnesses
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allow S to complete the Stage Two arguments. After the simulation ends, S
outputs the view of V∗ during the simulation.
Clearly S runs in polynomial time. The following lemma establishes zero-
knowledge.
Lemma 42. The following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable over n ∈ N:
{S V∗(x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗ ≈ {ViewV∗(P(x),V∗(x, z)}x∈L,z∈{0,1}∗
Proof. We use a simple hybrid argument.
Let S 1 be a simulator that is given a witness w for x ∈ L. S 1 proceeds as
S but instead uses w to complete the Stage Two argument. By the witness-
indistinguishable property of the Stage Two argument (and recall that witness-
indistinguishability is preserved under parallel repetition [23]), the output of
S (x) and S 1(x) are indistinguishable.
Let S 2 be the same simulator as S 1 except that S 2 uses fresh randomness for
the commitments c1, . . . , cm. Since S 1 chooses s uniformly, fs is a pseudorandom
function, and both S 1 and S 2 are efficient, the output of S 1(x) and S 2(x) are in-
distinguishable. (Formally, this step can be further split into m hybrids; the ith
hybrid uses fresh randomness in the first i parallel sessions, and uses pseudo-
randomness in the other sessions.)
Let S 3 be the same simulator as S 2 except that S 3 commits to 0n in the com-
mitments c1, . . . , cm. By the computational-hiding property of Com, the output
of S 2(x) and S 3(x) are indistinguishable. (Formally, this step can be further split
into m hybrids; the ith hybrid commits to 0n in the first i parallel sessions, and
commits following the strategy of S in the other sessions.)
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But S 3 is identical to the honest prover, i.e., the output of S 3(x) is identical to
the view of V∗. Therefore, we have shown that the output of S is computation-
ally indistinguishable from the view of V∗. 
4.7 Application to Resettably-Sound Arguments
In this section we show how to achieve more general notions of resettable sound-
ness that were not required for our main theorem. [26] implicitly shows that any
constant-round public-coin argument is fixed-input resettably-sound if the ver-
ifier uses a pseudo-random function to generate its messages. [5, Proposition
3.5] extends the analysis to show that any constant-round public-coin argument
of knowledge for L ∈ NP is a (full-blown) resettably-sound argument of knowl-
edge of L, again if the verifier uses a pseudo-random function to generate its
messages. We give a pair of analogous theorems below, based on our techniques
in Sect. 4.3.
Theorem 43. Let Π = (P,V) be a public-coin argument for an NP language L with
negligible soundness error. Define Π˜m = 〈Pm, V˜m〉 to be m parallel repetitions of Π with
the following modification: V˜m will sample a pseudo-random function f at the beginning
of the protocol, and construct each verifier message by applying f to the prover messages
received so far. Then, whenever m ≥ k2 log2 n, Π˜m is a fixed-input resettably-sound
argument.
Theorem 44. Let Π = (P,V) be a public-coin argument of knowledge for an NP lan-
guage L with negligible soundness error. Define Π˜m = 〈Pm, V˜m〉 similarly to Theo-
rem 43. Then, whenever m ≥ k2 log2 n, Π˜m is a resettably-sound argument of knowledge.
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Note that in contrast with Sect. 4.3, we have replaced poly-wise independent
hash-functions with pseudo-random functions. This is because a resettably-
sound argument needs to guard against all polynomial-time resetting attacks,
and so we cannot assume a universal bound on the running time of the attacks.
Proof sketch of Theorem 43. Suppose some polynomial time P∗m breaks the fixed-
input resettable-soundness property against V˜m. Let Vˆm be a hybrid verifier that
is identical to V˜m except that Vˆm uses a truly random function F instead of a
pseudo-random function f . Then, by the property of a pseudo-random func-
tion, P∗m also breaks the fixed-input resettable-soundness property against Vˆm.
Now, the techniques of Sect. 4.3.3 shows how to to construct a cheating P∗ based
on P∗m that contradicts the soundness property of Π. This gives a contradic-
tion. 
Proof sketch of Theorem 44. We use the same techniques as [5]. Consider using
the same proof sketch as Theorem 43. It is easy to extend the techniques of
Sect. 4.3.3 to full-blown resettable attacks where P∗m selects the input instances
adaptively. The main subtlety, as pointed out by [5], is the hybrid argument
involving the pseudo-random functions.
We need to show that if P∗m breaks the resettable-soundness property against
the pseudo-random V˜m, then it should also break the resettable-soundness prop-
erty against the truly random Vˆm. The subtlety here is that a computationally-
bounded distinguisher cannot determine whether P∗m has completed a success-
ful resetting attack or not, because it cannot determine whether the x’s chosen by
P∗m are in L or not. To overcome this obstacle, we require Π to be an argument of
knowledge, i.e., there is a witness-extraction algorithm. We may then apply the
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witness-extraction algorithm to P∗ (constructed from P∗m) to determine whether
the input instance accepted by V are indeed in the language L or not. 
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